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## International Federalism in Recent American Thought

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World War II sounded the death knell of the League of Nations; but from early in the conflict, even in the darkest hours, the age-old aspirations of men for international organization to keep the peace found myriad voices, some desperate, some defiant, but all crying a new urgency. There was a "longing in the air." Statesmen and scholars alike demanded enforceable world law and limitation of national sovereignty; philosophers and dreamers spoke of a world state. After the defeat of Hitler (and possibly of a Nazi world state), high hopes of this kind attended the forging of the United Nations; but the exigencies of practical politics, both domestic and international, constrained a diffident leadership to bring forth but a second version of the League of Nations. The performance of the United Nations since the war has confirmed initial suspicions of its incompetence to prevent war, founded as it was upon the sovereignty of member-nations, and confounded, as it proves, by the failure of its major premise: unanimity among the great powers. Its friendly critics in America and elsewhere have come to demand that it be strengthened, or be replaced by a more effective world organization, for they are convinced that no "collective security" system can prevent war any better than the League of Nations. Its defenders plead that it be given a chance, some sincerely believing that only by gradual evolution can effective institutions of peace be created. Others no doubt find it a convenient backdrop for continued pursuit of traditional diplomacy and power politics in which alone they have confidence, for nationalism persists as probably the most ponderous political and cultural phenomenon of mid-twentieth century.

Whether mankind can transcend national loyalties soon and muster sufficient world community to animate a world government presents a fateful question to an increasing number of thoughtful observers who

find no other hope for averting World War III. The advent of atomic weapons, jet propulsion, and other military wonders of modern scientific technology has dramatized a power saltation of unprecedented proportions before which human imagination falters. The new powers to destroy frighten some people, including a number of the experts in destruction.<sup>1</sup> The anxieties of many have been sharpened; the prospect of global war in this age of scientific revolution becomes a bleak, unmitigated catastrophe—perhaps the end of Western civilization.<sup>2</sup> The challenge, it is averred, must strike sparks from American leadership of the necessary vision, intelligence, courage, and will to overcome mass inertia; for the persistence of common aimlessness, sloth, and indifference, deviously and extensively cultivated by the vested interests of inaction, remains incontrovertible fact despite vague popular fears and general restiveness. This newly creative leadership must not only defeat the opposition of the "powerful illiterate," but also jostle aside those elder statesmen so steeped in international folkways of old as to have lost both the capacity and the desire to travel new roads. As Toynbee would say, not only must the cake of custom be broken, but the response must rise fully to the challenge if this most portentous cultural lag of our time is not to prove fatal.

From all the welter of thought and discussion during the past decade or more in the United States, a few voices rise most prominently. Even before lightning struck in 1939, the ominous clouds of war had sent Clarence K. Streit, foreign correspondent and former Rhodes scholar, scurrying to fly warning signals and to denounce, most impressively for our generation, absolute national sovereignty as the storm-maker<sup>3</sup>. He asked for a union of the English-speaking world, or of the western democracies, to ride out the Nazi tempest, and ultimately for larger political integration to maintain the coming peace. In his critique of the nation-state system, he was joined shortly by another clarion voice in Emery Reves, international propagandist and wartime refugee to America, who appealed for Yankee initiative to create a world-wide federal government.<sup>4</sup> Their appeals, highlighted by the unfolding tragedy of war, won new attention among the literati, artists, educators, churchmen, a few government officials, business and professional men and women, and numbers

<sup>1</sup>Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, eds., *One World Or None* (New York, 1946) contains articles commenting upon "the full meaning of the atomic bomb," contributed chiefly by atomic scientists.

<sup>2</sup>This familiar speculation deriving from Toynbee and Spengler gains new currency from sober reflection upon the atomic revolution. See Lewis Mumford, "Gentlemen: You Are Mad!" *Saturday Review of Literature* 29:5-6, March 2, 1946; Norman Cousins, "As 1960 Sees Us," *ibid.* 33: 7-13, August 5, 1950. Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization On Trial* (New York, 1948), pp. 38-39, 58-61.

<sup>3</sup>Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now* (New York, 1939); postwar ed., 1949.

<sup>4</sup>Emery Reves, *The Anatomy Of Peace* (New York, 1945).

among the plain people; and attracted support variously from older pacifist and internationalist elements. Streit and Reves may have said little more regarding the essence of the problem of war than scholars had been saying quietly all along, as in the studies and reports of the Commission To Study the Organization Of Peace under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<sup>8</sup>; but their success in reaching a wider public audience was most striking. And lawyer Richard Lee Humber egged on the state legislatures to follow the lead of Massachusetts by declaring their support for the principle of world federation.<sup>9</sup> Then in 1945 the shock of the atomic bomb upon American consciousness produced an immediate reaction among more sensitive spirits, notably giving rise to the demand by Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins and his colleagues for world government to provide ultimate solutions now.<sup>10</sup> Since the war a number of the atomic scientists have grown increasingly articulate in proclaiming the desperate need for supra-national authority to control "absolute" weapons, for these have reduced man's choice to "one world or none," a few of the more prominent, as Albert Einstein and Harold C. Urey, notably aligning themselves with various American groups advocating world government.<sup>11</sup>

Inspiration for strengthening the United Nations has instigated a prolific ferment of speculative thought, but much of it naturally represents but cautious groping for patchwork to make existing organization work better. Thus the Baruch proposal for the control of atomic energy earlier<sup>12</sup> and now the official American plan offered by Secretary Acheson for action by the General Assembly to circumvent the veto in the Security Council<sup>13</sup>, however impressive they may be to members of the Association For the United Nations and kindred spirits, would not fundamentally alter the nature of the system. Numerous other suggestions fall under a like characterization, as John Foster Dulles' proposal to improve representation in the General Assembly<sup>14</sup> and Ely Culbertson's remarkably ingenious plan to reduce the existing world balance of power to the

<sup>8</sup>Commission To Study the Organization Of Peace, "Preliminary Reports and Monographs," *International Conciliation*, No. 369, April, 1941; Quincy Wright, *A Study Of War* (Chicago, 1942), 2 vols., esp. Vol. II, Part 4.

<sup>9</sup>For text of the North Carolina resolution, followed as a model by a score or more states, see *International Conciliation*, No. 371, pp. 585-590, June, 1941.

<sup>10</sup>Robert M. Hutchins, *Comments on Chicago Round Table Of the Air*, August 24, 1947, *Common Cause* 1:121-122, October, 1947.

<sup>11</sup>Albert Einstein, "The Way Out," *One World Or None*, Ch. 14; *World Government News* (February, 1950), pp. 13-17; Harold C. Urey, "The Paramount Problem of 1949," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 5:283-288 (October, 1949).

<sup>12</sup>Department of State, *International Control of Atomic Energy* (Washington, 1948), Appendix V and *passim*.

<sup>13</sup>*Time*, October 2, 1950, p. 20; *ibid.*, October 23, 1950, p. 31.

<sup>14</sup>John Foster Dulles, *War Or Peace* (New York, 1950), pp. 188-210.

finitude of a complicated chess game.<sup>13</sup> Such thinking moves in an internationalist direction, but would not convert a league into a government. Genuine advocates of world government, whether inclining to build upon the existing structure of the United Nations or to depart radically therefrom, insist upon real political unity embracing the people of many nations that would be basically distinct from any collectivity of national sovereign units, however perfected organizationally and procedurally.

Among these American champions of a new departure, three groups emerge as probably most significant: the United World Federalists, the Atlantic Unionists, and "the Chicago group." The United World Federalists follow the inspiration of Reves, Humber, and Cord Meyer, Jr., their first national president; have won support from many eminent national figures; and address themselves most energetically to popular education and to lobbying upon official makers of American foreign policy.<sup>14</sup> They propose a world federal government of definitely limited powers but of universal membership. The second group comprises followers of Streit who now seek federal union among the nations party to the Atlantic Pact; they would devolve greater powers upon the federal government than most World Federalists contemplate, but would confine membership to a nucleus of trustworthy nations.<sup>15</sup> The Chicago group, presided over by Chancellor Hutchins and bearing the formal title of Committee To Frame A World Constitution, directs its appeal largely to the intelligentsia, and envisions a Republic of the World not only of universal membership but also of practically unlimited powers.<sup>16</sup> All three groups contemplate achieving larger political integration peacefully through voluntary federation of peoples now living in independent communities, hardly an individual among them finding any attraction in James Burnham's advocacy of an American bid for world empire<sup>17</sup>; for the basic premise in their thinking is that war constitutes the major evil of today and cannot serve to achieve world government without fatal confusion of means with ends.

In broad outline, the case for world government posits as virtually axiomatic the value of peace to mankind; rests negatively upon a categorical denial—a denial based upon the most searching appraisal of the long and bitter experience of peoples—of the efficacy of other roads to

<sup>13</sup>Ely Culbertson, *The World Federation* (New York, 1942); *Total Peace* (New York, 1943).

<sup>14</sup>United World Federalists, Inc., *Beliefs, Purposes, and Policies* (St. Louis, 1947) *et seq.* provide annual formulations of policy statements. They publish the monthly *World Government News*. Cf. Cord Meyer, Jr., *Peace Or Anarchy* (Boston, 1947).

<sup>15</sup>In addition to a postwar edition of *Union Now*, their most noteworthy work is, *The New Federalist* (New York, 1950) by Streit, Owen J. Roberts, and John F. Schmidt. Their organization publishes a magazine, *Freedom and Union*.

<sup>16</sup>G. A. Borgese *et al.*, *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* (Chicago, 1948). This group publishes the monthly periodical, *Common Cause*.

<sup>17</sup>James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World* (New York, 1947), pp. 181-199.

peace; finds encouragement in long-run evolution toward larger peace-groups in the strict sense, i.e., states and empires; discerns current evidence of dynamic forces, both material and cultural, impelling mankind toward world unity; and from the logic of the situation finds reason to believe that world government designed in part by human reason might well preserve peace among men on earth. The ramifications of the argument provide often persuasive replies to most of the familiar objections. Being unprecedented alone does not prove impossibility, as the records of history are strewn with political and social innovations as well as those in material aspects of civilization; and past experience with peaceful federation, especially the American union, provides suggestive mutations that evolution might well parallel at a different level of human community.<sup>17</sup> Such philosophical parries do not, of course, fully answer all difficulties about the proposed transition, nor do they satisfy the doubts of a Reinhold Niebuhr regarding the existence of sufficient human community and international-mindedness to support a world regime.<sup>18</sup> To such doubt, the reply comes that world loyalty and citizenship will grow as a product of world government if only prescient leadership can or will inspire men to try the grand experiment. And, furthermore, there are signs of more internationalism among the masses than influential and powerful opponents care to admit.<sup>19</sup> None profess to believe that world government would banish contingency from human affairs, or deny that real risks are involved in the great venture; but of the widely felt fear of world tyranny most of its champions explain that constitutionalism, federalism, separation of powers, responsible representation, a bill of rights, and other arrangements drawing chiefly upon Anglo-American political experience would minimize the danger. For the rest reliance must be put upon sagacious leadership and a prevailing sense of justice.

It is hardly within the scope of this article to examine all of the dialectics of the great debate.<sup>20</sup> But it seems clear that world government as a stupendous project in political engineering will have to be built upon existing institutions; as a job of political salesmanship it will have to start, as

<sup>17</sup>Mark Van Doren, *The Great Rehearsal* (New York, 1948), pp. viii-x and *passim*; Vernon Nash, *It Must Be Done Again* (New York, 1946), pamphlet; Arthur N. Holcombe, *A More Perfect Union* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 1-11, 428-429.

<sup>18</sup>Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs* 27: 379-388, April, 1949; *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York, 1946), pp. 153-190.

<sup>19</sup>Various American opinion polls, popular referenda in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and the election of delegates to a world constituent convention by Tennessee are at least straws in the wind indicating considerable popular sympathy.

<sup>20</sup>See "Proposals for Now Revising United Nations Into A Federal World Government," *Congressional Digest* 27:193-224 (September, 1948); Hornell Hart *et al*, *Toward Consensus for World Law and Order* (Durham, 1949); *The Reference Shelf*, Vol. 19, No. 5 and Vol. 20, No. 5; series of bibliographies appearing intermittently in *Common Cause*.

Professor Quincy Wright deftly puts it, "from where we are."<sup>21</sup> No other *modus operandi* would be consistent with the evolutionary hypothesis or verifiable experience. To provide closer union among people now living in independent states loosely confederated in the United Nations, the three American groups alike, therefore, turn to federalism. They differ with one another manifoldly on matters of membership, delegation of powers, details of governmental organization and procedure, intergovernmental relations, the question of sovereignty, and other subjects involved in the prospectus; but they share the common realization that better or more efficient supranational political integration can be achieved only through voluntary federation in which prospective member-nations or peoples can expect to enjoy enduring autonomy and continued significance in the scheme of things. It is proposed here to examine and appraise their exploitation of the concept of federalism and related doctrines in their quest for world government.

The government of the new larger federal union will be constituted of the necessary organs, legislative, executive, and judicial, to wield real powers, devolved upon it by the member-communities or by the people thereof according to the terms of a written constitution; its authority will be typically exerted by the enactment and enforcement of law directly upon individual citizens. Its jurisdiction will apply directly to persons, and not through the agency of national or other intermediate governments. Its laws will have the sanction of the organized physical force of the whole enlarged community; this means that its authority will be made real and effective by federal command of a military establishment and whatever additional enforcement agencies prove necessary. Its delegated powers, whether broad or strictly limited, will be readily exercised presumably as determined by the responsible, representative law-making assembly or parliament. In these several more generalized features, this federal vehicle for peace definitely bears the impress of the American federal union, and reflects the preoccupation of the authors with the merits of the model. The government of the union would be clearly distinguishable from a league or confederation; it would be closer union than the United Nations.

Federalism, however, as a principle of association in a larger unity of peoples who are already members of smaller communities admits of different answers to the question of who shall belong. On this score, Streit and his disciples, including the eminent former Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Owen J. Roberts, insist that membership shall be restricted to the western democracies now and for some time to come, although the ultimate goal remains world-wide union.<sup>22</sup> This restriction

<sup>21</sup>Wright, *A Study of War*, Vol. II, pp. 1304-1306; "Reactions from the International Jurists," *Common Cause* 2:63-65, September, 1948.

<sup>22</sup>*Union Now*, postwar ed., pp. 31-42, 62-84; *The New Federalist*, pp. 30-33, 42-45.

marks the sharpest cleavage between the projectors of Atlantic Union and their fellow advocates of world government, for both World Federalists and World Republicans believe universal membership from the beginning of the enterprise to be essential to its success. The reason for this initial exclusiveness is found chiefly in distrust of authoritarian regimes in other countries and the political immaturity of their peoples. As other countries grow toward maturity, they will become politically more liberal and democratic; and the original nucleus will expand by accession of new members. Meanwhile, there is obviously too great a cultural diversity between democracies and authoritarian societies to admit of a common political loyalty; whereas, among the fifteen selected democracies, including the United States, England, France, and others of the North Atlantic community, powerful economic, political, and cultural bonds, advantages of strategic geographical position, and a century-old tradition of living at peace with one another provide the sure foundations for mutual respect and confidence, for the necessary psychological and spiritual rapport to make common citizenship and loyalty quite feasible.<sup>20</sup>

The Atlantic Unionists reject universal federation now for other reasons. They confidently predict that a dictator would not tolerate world officials functioning within his jurisdiction in exercising authority upon individuals. They cannot believe that representatives of a dictatorship in a world parliament could be anything but puppets of the dictator; and their sharing in the exercise of world governmental power would be unthinkable, for it would poise an imminent threat to the human rights and liberties of peoples in freer lands. This danger of abuse of power is fundamental. Federal union of democracies and dictatorships would vitiate the principles of human liberty and government by consent of the governed; the free communities would inevitably degenerate, or the federation would founder upon schism. Streit cites the case of Russia as a clincher, and certainly the growing gulf between East and West in the present cold war would seem to support the analysis.<sup>21</sup>

World Federalists and the composers of the Draft World Constitution, however, hold fast to the view that all nations, or practically all (including certainly all of the great powers), must join in federal governmental union that is to have any real prospect of maintaining the peace of the world. Government is essentially a peace-group, and only within its reach can human society be saved from virtual anarchy and ready recourse to physical violence; the use and wont of traditional diplomacy, formal respect for international law (which is really not law), leagues, alliances, and even confederations in the game of power politics but ill conceal and little limit the unilateral pursuit of national interests by dint of force or threat of force. Modern war arises from the frictions generated by

<sup>20</sup>*Union Now*, pp. 65-69 and *passim.*; *The New Federalist*, pp. 31-33, 34-38.

<sup>21</sup>*Union Now*, pp. 79-81, 263-264, 313-315.

international fears and rivalries, and real governmental jurisdiction must be extended over all such areas of conflict if peace is to be imposed upon the antagonists.<sup>25</sup> To substitute a true reign of law for an always uncertain balance of power, government to enforce that law must have a reach as world-wide as modern science and technology, international economic interrelations, and political security fences encircling the globe. Nothing less will suffice. Partial world federation will not establish governmental competence over differences between the in-group and the out-group. The proposed Atlantic Union might well exacerbate the difficulties between East and West, widen the gulf, and bring war nearer.

Exponents of nuclear Atlantis reply that this last fear is misplaced. The Atlantic community is already united by defensive alliance; and, by exploiting the logic of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, has been reconciled with the continued functioning of the larger association. Furthermore, Atlantic Union would command such tremendous human and natural resources, comprising some ninety percent or more of the world supply of several vital sinews of war, that firm military posture on its part would readily discourage aggressive design by any alien power or combination of powers.<sup>26</sup> Such military posturing has, however, seldom prevented war, as Professor Schuman patiently reiterates, between sovereign states or rival blocs among them;<sup>27</sup> and it requires no long memory to know that adverse material odds did not intimidate Hitler from the gamble of war. For these and other reasons, the Chicago group sticks fairly consistently to the universalist position. World Federalists, on the other hand, in trying to grapple with the hypothetic dilemma arising from the possible failure of Russia and her satellites to join a world federation, find themselves gravitating toward a position not far removed, perhaps, from Atlantic Union. If initially world union should be shunned by suspicious nations, they explain, the pioneers should proceed with partial world federation; and, if war must come, the West would then be better prepared.<sup>28</sup> Here the argument seems to come full circle. But the West would have gained moral stature by having made the effort; and meantime an open standing invitation to federate might attract late-comers. A number of individuals among the World Federalists as well as of the Chicago group remain stubbornly optimistic that Russia would join a

<sup>25</sup>Reves, *Anatomy of Peace*, pp. 253-255 and *passim.*; Meyer, *Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 3-36, 148-160; United World Federalists, *How to Conquer War*, a strip film.

<sup>26</sup>*Union Now*, pp. 68-76; *The New Federalist*, p. 48; John Howard Ford and Clarence K. Streit, *We Need Hamilton's Plan Now* (Washington, 1948).

<sup>27</sup>Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 4th ed. (New York, 1948), pp. 352-353; cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-107.

<sup>28</sup>United World Federalists, Resolution on Russia and World Government, in Vernon Nash, *The World Must Be Governed* (New York, 1949), appendix B, pp. 196-197, 10-11; George Holt and W. C. Starkweather, "What About 'What About Russia?'" *World Government News* 8:13-18, May, 1950.

*bona fide* venture in federation<sup>29</sup>; certainly there can be no definitive proof unless an offer is actually made.

The verbal jousting between the nuclear and universalist schools of thought makes very clear to the interested layman the weighty imponderables involved in this exceedingly difficult kind of speculation. Uncertainties undeniably exist, and they cast the dogmatic assurances of a number of the protagonists in unreal light. Intense concentration upon the task of winning intellectual assent thus occasionally betrays the political evangelist into forensic excess, or the writer into marshalling factual data to fit his enthusiastic pursuit of a logically consistent pattern. However, imaginative insight into the future and its shrewdest appraisal are the very stuff of higher statesmanship and of human capacity for progress. And some of the skeptics and even grudging critics now and then agree that in looking to larger political integration the several advocates of world government are surveying the probable road of political future.<sup>30</sup>

The distribution of power in a world union between the federal government and the member-nations constitutes one of the most critical aspects of federation. The American advocates have agreed that real powers must be delegated to the union by the antecedent states or by the peoples thereof in a constituent act that, to some of the more perceptive, simultaneously signalizes achievement of political unity and becoming one people.<sup>31</sup> Whether this action involves a shift of sovereignty from the participating national states to a new single world state; or sharing, splitting, or ceding part of the sovereignty of national states to the federal union; or merely delegating powers of government without immediate concern about questions of ultimate supremacy—seems to provoke a wide variety of answers, especially among World Federalists who present the interesting spectacle of reverting to the equivocal concept of divided sovereignty of the early American Federalists. Their unwillingness to face the fact that delegation of important powers to a world authority probably will impel a corresponding change in sovereignty

<sup>29</sup>Meyer, *Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 230-231; James P. Warburg, "The United States and the World Crisis," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 258: 112-123 (July, 1948); G. A. Borgese, "What To Do With Russia," *Common Cause* 1:211-227; Erich Kahler, "An Open Letter to Harold Urey," *Common Cause* 3: 396-400 (March, 1950).

<sup>30</sup>Burnham, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-48; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report 2501, September 1, 1950, as reported in *World Government News* (October, 1950), pp. 4-5; Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-204; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York, 1948), pp. 398-402, 404-406.

<sup>31</sup>The Draft World Constitution declares, "The sovereignty of the Federal Republic of the World resides in the people of the world." Article 3. Cf. E. B. White, *The Wild Flag* (Boston, 1946), pp. 4, 41, 65, 80-81, 180-182; Hans Kelsen, "Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations," *American Journal of International Law* 42: 784 (October, 1948).

moves several of their leading exponents to speak and write of surrendering a part of national sovereignty, or of limiting national sovereignty only to the extent necessary to establish effective world powers.<sup>28</sup> Others, similarly anxious over the risks of losing prospective adherents by frank treatment of the question, tend to deny the significance of the concept, after the fashion of earlier philosophical enthusiasts of international law or of later "realist" students of politics who knock over a straw horse by asserting that sovereignty does not completely explain all human political conduct. It is noteworthy that none of their pluralism, or realism, or championing revived conceptions of a higher law can blink the facts of loss of national independence in the new union and of higher resolution of possible conflicts between federal authority and that of member-nations. A very interesting new perspective, emerging from the travail of mind and soul among those who grapple most earnestly with these difficulties, is that in the modern world game of power politics the only real substance in, or significant aspect of, the concept of sovereignty is the right of an aggressor nation to go to war. A peaceful nation never exercises the privilege, and therefore suffers little loss by forswearing it upon entering a world political union.<sup>29</sup>

As regards specific proposals for constituent grant of power to the federal union, World Federalists generally are quite explicit in urging that they be entirely adequate for preventing war but also be strictly limited to that necessary minimum; Atlantic Unionists advocate a broader scope of power, somewhat analogous to that of the national government within the United States of America; and the World Republicans go farthest in insisting that the powers of world government shall be broad enough not only to maintain peace but also to provide justice among the peoples of the world. Presumably sufficient national autonomy will remain to the members of the federation to insure an enduring prospect of self-government and satisfactory pursuit of distinct ways of life, although the latter group appears less concerned with federalism as a guarantee of local autonomy than as a structural incident in the orchestration of world community. World Federalists are most anxious to conserve national autonomy as broadly as possible and to hold world authority to a minimum; several of their more prominent spokesmen fear that inchoate world community would be severely strained by broader delegation of

<sup>28</sup>Reves, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-144; Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 151; Nash, *The World Must Be Governed*, pp. xiii-xv, 36. Cf. James Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, Ford ed. (New York, 1898), pp. 246-247, 249-252, 303-305, 311-312.

<sup>29</sup>W. T. Holliday, "Our Final Choice," *Readers Digest* (January, 1948), p. 4; Reves, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144, 162-163, 195-196; Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Nash, *The World Must Be Governed*, pp. 46-47.

power and might die aborning.<sup>54</sup> Nationalist fears and jealousies may well mount with greater demands for world power, and incite opposition to prohibitive proportions. Their estimate of the temper of the American people, based upon most comprehensive efforts to win popular and official adherence to the cause within the proximate future, convinces them that asking for more would be self-defeating. Even putting over the minimalist case remains highly problematical. Moreover, they are not convinced that coping successfully with the evil of war requires greater world authority than powers to: 1) prohibit recourse to war by nations and incitement thereto by lesser groups or individuals, 2) compel disarmament by members down to internal police levels, 3) establish preventive measures of inspection and control, 4) command a preponderant military establishment and other enforcement agencies to uphold its laws, 5) tax for necessary revenues to sustain its activities, and 6) provide the governmental machinery for responsible and effective exercise of its powers, including significantly courts with jurisdiction over individuals as well as states.<sup>55</sup>

The more sweeping scope of proposed powers for Atlantic federal union is readily apparent. The list includes powers to: 1) control citizenship in the new body politic, 2) control foreign relations and provide military defense, 3) regulate foreign and domestic commerce, 4) provide a common money and credit system and take other measures to integrate the union economy, and 5) operate a postal service and regulate or operate other communications.<sup>56</sup> This project might be designated the medial position, and would obviously involve greater surrender of separate identity by the member-nations than the minimal position. Assuming other factors to be equal, the advantages of such political and economic merger over more limited federation are obvious. The union would be closer, stronger, and probably more prosperous. Streit and company feel confident that within the Atlantic community of democracies such authority would not be abused for regional advantage, but could be used with mutual trust and confidence for the benefit of all member peoples.

The Chicago Constitutionalists far surpass the other two groups in submitting an astounding bid for world governmental power. The World Republic would have powers to: 1) maintain peace, 2) adjudicate all conflicts between component units, 3) pacify intrastate insurrections,

<sup>54</sup>Meyer, Statement to House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. C. R. 64, October 12, 1949, *Common Cause* 3: 350 (February, 1950); *Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 148, 159-160; United World Federalists Policy Committee, Preliminary Policy Draft, Majority Report, 1950, pp. 3-4. Cf. Louis Wirth, remarks in *The World Community* (Chicago, 1948), Harris Foundation Lectures, Quincy Wright, ed., pp. 19-20; Kenneth E. Boulding, *ibid.*, p. 83; Hans J. Morgenthau, *ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>55</sup>Meyer, *Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 151-161; United World Federalists Policy Committee, Majority Report, 1950, p. 2.

<sup>56</sup>Streit, *Union Now*, pp. 134-137; Streit et al, *The New Federalist*, pp. 21-25.

4) collect taxes, 5) regulate transportation, communication, and commerce, 6) issue money and control credit, 7) control migration of people, 8) develop human and natural resources for the benefit of mankind, 9) promote the progressive fulfillment of human rights and duties, 10) alter national boundaries, 11) form new member-states, and 12) administer non-self-governing peoples and territories—among other powers.<sup>27</sup> World authority would be so comprehensive as to be practically unlimited in scope; national autonomy would be minimum and always subject to the discretion of the world government. Whatever institutional safeguards might suffuse the structure and governing processes of this world state with protection of individual rights and the substance of wisdom and justice, it is clear that the role of pre-existing states would be reduced to insignificance. The prospect constitutes such a giant leap beyond familiar experience as to carry human imagination surely into the realm of philosophical absolutes. Indeed, Plato's philosopher-kings might well have quailed before the task of wielding such authority wisely. The classical inspiration of the Chicago group is apparent here as well as in other features of their ambitious project.

In fact, their primary concern with world-wide justice among men clinches their kinship to ancient Greek idealist speculation. In asking for broad power to make universal justice prevail, they argue that nothing less can insure human tranquility and peace. Hutchins proclaims:

There are minimum moral and spiritual requirements (of world government) too; and these may be summed up in the single word justice. The advancement of man in spiritual excellence and physical welfare is the common goal of mankind. Universal peace is the prerequisite for the pursuit of that goal. Justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace. Peace and justice stand or fall together. Men will fight until they get their rights.<sup>28</sup>

The price admittedly will not be small. It will involve not only the merging of national sovereignties into a single world polity, but a spiritual reorientation embracing the moral equality of men and a new-found willingness to do justice at home and abroad. In the dialectics of Hutchins, G. A. Borgese, Mortimer J. Adler, and others of this group, there appears little of the intellectual humility and fundamental skepticism regarding the substance of justice that has traditionally characterized rationalist liberalism and loomed so large in American political thinking from early before James Madison down through the years to find classic expression in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Charles A. Beard. That which is to be feared is not that there will be too much power, but that there will not be enough. And whose conceptions of justice are to guide the use of this power? Those among members of a world council twice removed by intervening electoral bodies from any popular mandate; one

<sup>27</sup>*Draft World Constitution*, pp. 7-9.

<sup>28</sup>Robert M. Hutchins, "The Constitutional Foundations for World Order," *Foundations for World Order* (Denver, 1949), pp. 111-112.

suspects these new philosopher-kings to be largely conceived in the image of the Chicago intellectuals themselves. The general reaction of sceptical American temper, indoctrinated so long in constitutionally limited government, accustomed to challenging governmental wisdom, and growing in taste for direct popular responsibility, will inevitably raise the question: is all this exalted power necessary? Ultimately yes, comes the answer, and therefore also definitely now.

The minimal approach of most World Federalists is condemned as negative and non-democratic. A world federal union limited simply to keeping the peace might well become a twentieth century Holy Alliance serving only to maintain the *status quo*. It could become simply an instrument for getting Russia under control, or more generally a "kennel for underdogs." It would not win popular support widely, and would be foredoomed by the stultifying posture of "sitting on the lid." To have any prospect of success, a world government must implement freedom from want as well as freedom from fear.<sup>49</sup> The socialist implications of the whole case are quite clear; no socialist world party could want more comprehensive power over the economy than power to develop human and natural resources for the benefit of mankind. The sympathetic comments of distinguished visitors from Europe make the fact quite explicit, as Thomas Mann applauds "the kind of liberating communism which is inherent in it" (i.e., in the Draft World Constitution).<sup>50</sup> It is exactly this over-reaching which condemns World Republic in the eyes of most Americans who are neither socialists nor devotees of comprehensive international revisionism. Authority of this kind exploited to impose a world leveling program upon the American economy and upon all more fortunate peoples might well become world tyranny however noble its motivation. The world military organization would then become the instrument not only for curbing war-making national sovereignty, but also for cashiering currently achieved national levels of prosperity among the peoples of the world.

The canny student may discern a primarily didactic purpose in the extreme position of the Chicago group; a Socratic gadfly may be most provocative of fruitful thought and discussion. Certainly numbers among the coterie show a readiness to go along with more pedestrian progress in the right direction. So Professor McIlwain writes:

(We) may point out that our great problem now is not to create a perfect World Government but to make a beginning that may possibly develop into something

<sup>49</sup>Anonymous, "Melchisedec and the Minimalist," *Common Cause* 1: 281 (February, 1948); Erich Kahler, "The Question of a Minimum Constitution," *ibid.* 1: 421-423 (June, 1948); Harrison Wofford, "Dead End: Federalism Limited," *ibid.* 1: 382-388 (May, 1948).

<sup>50</sup>Thomas Mann, Comment on Draft World Constitution, *Common Cause* 1: 366 (May, 1948); George Catlin, "World Government and Social Justice," *Common Cause* 1: 423-424 (June, 1948).

better in time. We must bring in the facts of history in answer to . . . theoretical objections. Plato was satisfied with a "second-best" in the practical state of the *Laws* though it fell far short of the ideal in the *Republic*.<sup>41</sup>

Other maximalists, however, persist in decrying the dangers of gradualism; and insist that human experiences establishes the necessity, when the opportunity appears, of a sudden leap all the way to world community; a half-hearted effort will fail. The transition from the national state to world polity constitutes essentially a revolution, and must be accomplished by an entirely adequate augmentation of power at once. It can not be drifted into piece-meal, as by functional federation; nor grown into imperceptibly, as the British Empire is reputed to have evolved during a prolonged spell of absent-mindedness.<sup>42</sup>

Several more prominent figures among the World Federalists have felt the sting of maximalist criticism, and have occasionally acknowledged the probable need for extension of other powers than the indispensable minimum at some time or other. Thus Cord Meyer contemplates the desirability of expanding authority of the U.N. Trusteeship Council over colonial peoples generally.<sup>43</sup> A few among them flirt with going over to the maximal position altogether, as Vernon Nash who writes fluently of world power to "control all matters which affect to a vital degree the safety and well-being of all mankind." As a matter of fact, Nash refuses to commit himself precisely; he recognizes the political infeasibility of "any unnecessary additional power" that initially "will make the already difficult task . . . more difficult," but still aspires to world government with "power to provide a tolerable measure of justice among peoples," for "peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice."<sup>44</sup> The ambivalence in his thinking reflects differences among the rank and file, but the great majority hews carefully to the minimum delegation of power in annually formulated statements of objectives. It is denied that such a position derives from callous indifference to human suffering, or from any purpose to intrench the political *status quo* upon mankind. On the contrary, they feel confident that economic cooperation and considerable humanitarian alleviation will be achieved by voluntary enterprises among nations; e.g., the activities of the various U.N. auxiliary organizations and the American Point Four program move in that direction.

Furthermore, in the present context of world affairs surcease from war, advocates of world government agree, promises to be the greatest

<sup>41</sup>Charles H. McIlwain, "Some Considerations of Sovereignty," *Common Cause* 1: 129 (October, 1947).

<sup>42</sup>Erich Kahler, "The Case for World Government," *Common Cause* 1: 6-8 (July, 1947); Andrea Chiti-Batelli, "Functional Federalism," *ibid.* 3: 472-475 (April, 1950); Nash, *The World Must Be Governed*, pp. 120-121; Quincy Wright, "Fundamental Problems Of International Organization," *International Conciliation*, No. 369, pp. 480-481 (April, 1941).

<sup>43</sup>Meyer, *Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 176-181.

<sup>44</sup>Nash, *The World Must Be Governed*, pp. xi, 4-5, 7, 19-20, 38.

possible boon to mankind, diverting manpower and resources anew to peaceful uses and enlarging human liberty by freeing men from current imperatives of national defense. Therefore, the minimalists urge, let us put first things first. To insist upon world government with power broadly to mete out justice to peoples and to provide ultimate solutions for all human ills now, provoking fears, suspicions, and even outright hostility, will insure defeat of the project; peace will have been sacrificed to doctrinaire pride. And yet peace alone would constitute a large increment of justice itself, for will not atomic and bacteriological war among the great powers be "the most monstrous injustice" conceivable? Too much is at stake to risk by overplaying the hand. If there is any prospect for strengthening the United Nations into an effective instrument for keeping the peace, World Federalists and many friends and sympathizers agree, it can be realized only by asking for powers that are absolutely essential. In their estimate American opinion will not sustain more. And, even so, reassurances remain to be established beyond reasonable doubt that minimum power will be used wisely and not perverted into an instrument of a new, higher imperialism inimical to legitimate American and other national interests.

Thus the question of representation becomes crucial. World governmental powers are generally vested in a representative law-making body based upon national constituencies or regional groupings thereof. The projectors recognize the critical nature of the task of building a world parliament that will be representative, responsible, and of a disposition to self-restraint as well as to conscientious performance of duty. Details of proposed structure, organization, and procedure vary quite widely. Cord Meyer suggests enacting the basic laws by constituent process involving reference back to the member-nations voting by a two-thirds majority. Then the present U.N. General Assembly could be relied upon to enact implementing statutes; this precaution must be taken, he avers, until genuinely free elections can be assured among peoples now ruled by dictatorships. Possibly then the members of the federal assembly could be elected by direct popular vote.<sup>6</sup> As a group, World Federalists do not commit themselves definitely upon the initial structure of the world legislature, but explain that numerous details of this kind are better left to a world convention authorized to draft proposed revisions of the U.N. Charter or a new world constitution. A few leading members including Nash, however, seem to accept popular election as de-

<sup>6</sup>Emile Benoit-Smulyan, "Why Minimal World Government?" *Common Cause* 1: 461-463 (July, 1948); "American Foreign Policy for Survival," *Ethics* 56: 286, 288, 290; Cord Meyer, Jr., *Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 150-151, 187. Cf. Arnold Brecht, "Distribution of Powers Between An International Government and the Governments Of National States," *American Political Science Review* 37: 864-865 (October, 1943).

<sup>7</sup>*Peace Or Anarchy*, pp. 161-165.

sirable from the outset.<sup>47</sup> Atlantic Unionists with an eye to the American model would have the assembly chosen by direct popular vote, and the Council of the World Republic would be based indirectly upon worldwide popular elections.

The tentative thinking of World Federalists upon representation in a world parliament is quite flexible, and indulges readily the more precise suggestions coming from its own numbers and from other groups. Atlantic Unionists prefer two houses with population made the chief basis of representation in one house and the separate identities of member-communities in the other.<sup>48</sup> Other ideas from various sources include achieving the same kind of concurrent majority within a unicameral body by two successive votes, one requiring a numerical majority, the other a unit majority. Other inspiration turns to weighted representation to produce compound formulae of several factors, such as population, natural resources, industrial development, foreign trade, literacy, educational attainments, etc.; the professional enthusiasm of some of the experts produce extremely sophisticated plans built upon advanced statistical procedures.<sup>49</sup> Most of this thinking upon representation is clearly stimulated by concern over the problem of abandoning the legal myth of equality of nations, now the basis of representation in the U.N. General Assembly, without going over simply to representation proportional to population. Popular numerical representation alone would arouse anew American fears and those of other more fortunate peoples of being ruled by alien majorities representing the backward masses of Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. The national sensibilities of these very same underprivileged people, however, may well nullify efforts to employ weighted representation.<sup>50</sup> Probably the simplest and most practicable compromise would be to follow in general the model of the American Congress. Equal representation of states in one house to counterbalance more popular representation in the other would follow modern experience of the more impressive federal systems in the United States, Brazil, Australia, Switzerland, and elsewhere, and would probably better assure federal recognition of the distinct interests of autonomous states than any other formula.

The composers of the Draft World Constitution diverge from the others quite widely again in their thinking about representation. Founded

<sup>47</sup>*The World Must Be Governed*, pp. 55, 61-62.

<sup>48</sup>*The New Federalist*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>49</sup>Reginald Lang, "Representation In A World Legislature," *Common Cause* 3: 37-43 (August, 1949); Quincy Wright and Louis Sohn, "Weighted Representation In A World Legislature," *ibid.* 3: 72-81 (September, 1949); Charles E. Merriam, "Representation In A World Legislature," *ibid.* 3: 4'6-420 (March, 1950).

<sup>50</sup>Edmond Taylor, *Richer By Asia* (Boston, 1947), pp. 396, 419-432; Mintauts Chakste, "Justice And Law in the Charter of the United Nations," *American Journal of International Law* 42: 590 (July, 1948); Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 401-402.

at bottom upon popular vote, it would be winnowed through nine regional electoral colleges and distributed numerically upon the basis of equality of regions; the regions in turn comprise groupings of nations that seem to reflect the authors' sense of compromise regarding their geophysical and economic significance, political and cultural affinity, and suitability perhaps to manifold balancing of national interests in the domestic politics of the new enlarged community. The membership of the World Council so constituted would be augmented by a few representatives of non-governmental international organizations. In addition, for advisory and consultative purposes the World Council would be aided by a House of Nationalities, an occupationally representative Senate, and an Institute of Science, Education, and Culture. Although the number of electors from each nation is to be proportional to population, representation in the world legislature significantly shifts to equality of regions.<sup>41</sup> Utilization of the electoral-college device and emphasis upon regionalism in representation reveals again a tendency to depreciate the role of national communities in the affairs of the new world state. Existing power relations would undergo a very thorough reshuffling. Further, the exercise of world power would be farther removed from enforcement of popular responsibility than has become the use and wont of democratic regimes. New latitude in this regard coupled with the great complexity of the whole scheme might well pervert its politics into a game in which the vested interests of the governors would loom unhealthily large.

For the most part American thought agrees upon setting up a full apparatus of union government including executive and judicial organs competent to administer its laws. The executive would certainly command the indispensable international police force; this force would be fully organized and activated and not an *ad hoc* assemblage of national units. Those who would build upon the United Nations would convert the Security Council into a plural executive responsible to and subject to direction by the world parliament. Other tentative thinking suggests a compromise between the presidential and cabinet types of executive, but insists that the only essentials in the federal executive are energy and political responsibility. The Draft World Constitution would have a permanent executive, elected for six-year term by the combined electoral colleges, and a cabinet responsible to the World Council; constitutional safeguards would require regional distribution of membership in the cabinet. This model plan also contemplates establishing a world planning agency and a classically inspired Tribune of the People with the distinctive function of defending "the natural and civil rights" of individuals and minority groups. The several schools of thought agree further upon the necessity of an

<sup>41</sup>*Draft World Constitution, Articles 4-8.*

independent judiciary with jurisdiction over individuals and states; it would exercise the power of judicial review to enforce constitutional limitations upon union political agencies and member-states alike.<sup>53</sup>

All groups show to a remarkable degree the influence of American experience in their predilection for various applications of checks and balances among the organs of the world government. In addition to judicial review, they severally rely upon the suspensory executive veto counterbalanced by legislative over-riding, legislative impeachment of the executive, increased legislative majorities for exercise of important powers, specific constitutional prohibitions, reservation of powers to the states, and declarations of human rights. World Federalists debate among themselves whether the bill of rights should protect the individual only against the world government or also against the governments of constituent communities.<sup>54</sup> World Republicans not only insist upon the latter alternative, but also strike out boldly to make explicit constitutional declaration of the rights of minority groups. Obviously one of the major purposes of these various constitutional devices is to insure that world government will function as limited government confined within the metes and bounds prescribed by sovereign authority of the new greater society; constitutional government under a reign of law may exercise the power to preserve the peace, augment human liberty, and variously promote the happiness and well-being of all men.

The imaginative prospect, whether considered severally or jointly, is a glowing one. These American exponents and their fellows in Europe and Asia fall within a great tradition harking back through Woodrow Wilson and Henry IV of France to Dante and earlier. They seriously believe, however, that the evolution of civilization has reached the point of converting such projects from Utopian prematurity to imperatives exceedingly relevant now to the possibilities of further progress if not of human survival. Their zeal in the cause seems, nevertheless, to have betrayed them variously into doctrinaire positions that may hinder rather than promote its realization. Atlantic Unionists ask for greater political integration among the Western democracies than popular opinion seems ready to accept, and they fail to convince many that partial world union can forestall war between East and West. A supremely wise and accomodating diplomacy will still be necessary; and that, the dissenters urge, is what we should concentrate our efforts upon now.<sup>55</sup> Universalists avoid this latter pitfall, but still struggle unavailingly to persuade

<sup>53</sup>*The New Federalist*, pp. 70-74; Meyer, *Peace or Anarchy*, pp. 168-169; *Draft World Constitution*, Articles 18, 33.

<sup>54</sup>John C. Holt II and Joel I. Brooke, "Civil Rights: How Far Shall the World Government Protect Them?" *World Government News* (September, 1950), pp. 17-21.

<sup>55</sup>Dean Rusk, Statement to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee on Revision of the United Nations Charter, February, 1950, *Common Cause* 4: 26-30 (August, 1950); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Part 10, pp. 419-445.

official circles and powerful and influential groups of the political and cultural feasibility of their own ambitious projects. Even seemingly favorable opinion in resolutions endorsing the principle of world federation may falter before coming to cases on a concrete program. Most significantly they have not allayed fears and suspicions that such a revolutionary undertaking would involve grave risks of reducing cherished national communities to mere administrative conveniences of a world state. Moreover, to emphasize the demand for world power broad enough to cope with all human ills, as World Republicans and occasionally a few World Federalists do, is to ask for a surrender of trust and confidence in various closer surrounding unities for a leap into the unknown. Doubts multiply at a giddy pace upon contemplating the possibility that the cause of peace may serve as a stalking horse for comprehensive international levelling in the name of justice. To deny that federal authority, although girded about by structural and procedural checks of diverse sorts, can be perverted to purposes not originally intended, or enlarged beyond constitutional warrant, is to ignore American history of the middle period. Conflicts of interest involving world policy would arise and might even provoke international civil war; certainly the American Civil War demonstrated that federal union is no infallible guarantee against it.

At the present stage of American political consciousness, only the minimalist case of the World Federalists and their sympathizers would appear to capitalize fully upon federalism as a device for winning consent upon that which is most essential now. If its intricacies can be exploited to assure great national autonomy that will endure effectively while achieving political unity for peace, then at some propitious juncture in world affairs American acquiescence may be won.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately the prospect is not improved by those World Federalists whose evasiveness about the scope of world governmental power might make the minimal case but an entering wedge for future expansion. As a vehicle for attaining larger political integration, federalism may serve as an educational instrument. In its use, neither talking over the heads of those who must learn nor incessant recourse to "scare psychology" can inspire the necessary confidence to win assent. Undeviatingly frank admission of the contingencies involved and deliberate confession of serious risks while persistently exploring the probable goods to be achieved may succeed. No other approach can fully realize the value of federalism as a principle of unity in diversity, of political union of diverse peoples agreeing upon some matters while choosing to remain severally free otherwise. No other attitude is consistent with the practical wisdom of the American Founding Fathers in putting first things first.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Charles E. Merriam, "Physics and Politics," *American Political Science Review* 40: 445-457 (June, 1946); Pitman B. Potter, "The Logic Of International Relations And Organization," *ibid.* 44: 661-668 (September, 1950).

## The British Isolationist Attitude: An Example of the 1930's

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One of the foremost aims of American foreign policy in Europe today is the unification of the nations of western Europe into something approaching a United States of Europe. The architects of this policy appear not to realize, however, that such an aim can only be accomplished by uprooting five hundred or more years of historical development. If the United States is to accomplish this goal it will require the substitution of a whole new *Weltanschauung* for the rabid nationalism which has dominated Europe for over half a century. The manifold difficulties involved are evidenced by the refusal of the states of western Europe to join wholeheartedly in carrying out this aim of American foreign policy. The European state least willing to go along with us on this American aim appears to be Great Britain. As a matter of practical policy, it is not at all certain that Britain should join in this proposed unification of western Europe. But, whether it should or not, the fact remains that Winston Churchill worked toward this goal of United States foreign policy as long as he and his Conservative party were out of power. Since the election of October, 1951, however, Churchill has tended to reverse himself in this respect. Since he has become prime minister, his inspired utterances at Strassburg have been replaced by an isolationist policy which is strikingly similar to that of the Labour government that preceded him.

This isolationist attitude which Churchill has manifested since becoming prime minister is nothing new in the annals of British foreign policy. As has often been said, Britain is a ship which is anchored in European waters, but a ship that is always ready to sail away. The pages of history are full of occasions when the British ship lifted anchor and put out to sea, much to the detriment of herself as well as the rest of Europe. Probably no more graphic example of this British tendency to desert the continent in times of crisis can be found than Britain's reaction to Germany's bold aggression in the Rhineland in 1936. In March of that year the British ship of state chose to sail away from its European harbor with almost catastrophic results for Europe and the rest of the world.

The story of this crisis in the Rhineland goes back to the years following the First World War. In those years France wanted to make sure that if another war came, that war would be fought in Germany and not in France.<sup>1</sup> The device for getting such a guarantee was the demilitarized

<sup>1</sup>D. W. Brogan, *The Development of Modern France (1870-1939)* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940), 698, 700; Elizabeth R. Cameron, *Prologue to Appeasement: A Study in French Foreign Policy 1933-1936* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1942), 195.

Rhineland. Britain joined with France at Versailles in 1919 to prohibit the militarization of the left bank of the Rhine River as well as the east bank fifty kilometers from the river.<sup>3</sup> The legal guarantee thus given the French was reaffirmed in 1925 by the treaty of Locarno, a treaty made with full German participation. Article IV, 1 and 2, of this pact of Locarno provided that if the demilitarized Rhineland should be violated the matter was to be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. Article IV, 3, however, allowed the parties to take immediate action in the event of a "flagrant breach" of the demilitarized zone. The signatories of the pact were bound to come to the aid of the power against whom the violation was directed. The only restriction on this immediate action was that the powers should be bound by subsequent recommendations made by the League Council.<sup>4</sup>

This legal guarantee of a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland given to France at Versailles and Locarno was nothing short of anathema to the grandiose schemes for future German greatness envisaged by Adolf Hitler.<sup>5</sup> The German *Reichskanzler* who came to power in 1933 wanted to expand Southeastward and Eastward. This was militarily impossible as long as the whole Rhine valley lay demilitarized. The Rhineland had to be made militarily secure before the *Drang nach Osten* could begin.<sup>6</sup>

Hitler solved the dilemma presented by this demilitarized zone by the simple expedient of breaking the Versailles and Locarno treaties. On March 7, 1936, against the advice of his generals, he marched troops into the Rhineland. This bold action involved a great gamble for the *Führer*. His troops even had orders to beat a hasty retreat if opposed by the French in any way.<sup>7</sup> The humiliation which this would have involved might conceivably have led to the downfall of the Hitler regime.

Hitler was well aware of the calculated risk which he was taking, and he also knew that his willful treaty-breaking would not be well received by the rest of the world. He therefore tried to justify his action on the grounds that France had already violated the Locarno pact by negotiating

<sup>3</sup>Articles 42, 43, 44, *The German Treaty Text* (London: Institute of International Affairs, 1920), 33.

<sup>4</sup>The Rhine Pact of Locarno, October 16, 1925, as published in F. J. Berber (ed.), *Locarno: A Collection of Documents* (London: William Hodge and Company, Ltd., 1936), 51-52.

<sup>5</sup>Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (116-118th Auflage, Munchen: Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, 1934).

<sup>6</sup>Frederick L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve: the Crises of Diplomacy 1933-1939* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 206, 208.

<sup>7</sup>Testimony of von Neurath, June 24, 1946, in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg: Allied High Control Council, 1948) XVI, 625, 626; Testimony of Jodl, June 4, 1946, in *ibid.*, XV, 347.

a treaty with Russia in the previous year.<sup>7</sup> This was no more than a pretext,<sup>8</sup> however, and so to further mollify the democracies, especially Britain, the announcement of the German move into the Rhineland was accompanied by abstruse "peace proposals." These proposals were adroitly drawn to confuse the issue by throwing "sand in the eyes of the 'peace-loving' men of the West,"<sup>9</sup> and, as Winston Churchill has so aptly put it, to give "comfort for everyone on both sides of the Atlantic who wished to be humbugged."<sup>10</sup>

These attempts at placation did not keep the western democracies from rising in moral indignation against Hitler's aggression. The paramount consideration, however, was whether France would take immediate action against Germany or would refer the matter to the League Council. The German troops had orders to turn back if they met resistance, so immediate action would have put a swift and sure end to the whole crisis. But, the French government, which was then under the premiership of Albert Sarraut, was itself facing a cabinet crisis over the unstable condition of France's economy. It soon became eminently clear that such a shaky French government would take no strong measures against Germany without the avowed support of Great Britain. The reaction of the British to Hitler's *coup* thus becomes quite vital to the outcome of the Rhineland crisis.

The first reaction of the British to this flagrant breach of the treaties would obviously be to decry such lawlessness. Whether, however, Britain herself would give France the full support called for by those same treaties was highly problematical. The Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin had on many occasions maintained that it would live up to its treaty obligations.<sup>11</sup> This seems to have been only lip-service, for when the time came for action instead of promises, the government began to make reservations. On March 9, Foreign Minister Anthony

<sup>7</sup>German Memorandum, March 7, 1936, in *British and Foreign State Papers* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), CXL, 520; Memorandum by the German Government, March 7, 1936, in Stephen Heard, and John W. Wheeler-Bennett (eds.), *Documents on International Affairs 1936* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 41-42.

<sup>8</sup>That Hitler's claim had no validity in international law is shown in Sir John Fischer Williams, "Sanctions under the Covenant," *British Year Book of International Law, 1936*, XVII, 130-149; Quincy Wright, "The Rhineland Occupation and the Enforcement of the Treaties," *American Journal of International Law*, XXX (July, 1936), 486-494.

<sup>9</sup>William L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), 50. For the specific proposals offered by Germany see the German Memorandum of March 7, 1936, in the *British and Foreign State Papers*, CXL, 520-521.

<sup>10</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: the Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 192-193.

<sup>11</sup>To cite one example, see 308 *House of Commons Debates*, 5th Series (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), 918.

Eden said that he regretted "the action which the German Government was taking in respect of the demilitarized zone." In his opinion, "this amounted to the unilateral repudiation of a treaty freely negotiated and freely signed." But, he went on, "there is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities." He then made a qualification not voiced before when he said that Britain will come to the aid of France if "*any actual attack upon France or Belgium occurs.*" In regard to the "peace proposals" contained in the German memorandum, Eden said that "no opportunity must be missed which offers any hope of amelioration."<sup>1309</sup> Thus, the official view of the Conservative government had become as follows: it deprecated such a disregard for international law as Hitler's march into the Rhineland, but it would do nothing unless French soil were actually invaded, and it was very anxious to avoid trouble by examining Herr Hitler's "peace proposals." That, of course, was the reaction that the *Führer* had been counting on. He was willing to talk forever. The more talk there was, the more time he would have to make the Rhineland militarily secure.

The reaction of the members of the Houses of Commons and Lords to Hitler's Rhineland *coup*, in the days following March 7, generally followed this pattern laid down by the government. The members condemned the *Führer's* action as a breach of international law. Sir Samuel Hoare, for instance, a Conservative from Chelsea and a former foreign minister, said that he joined with Eden in condemning "a flagrant breach of a treaty voluntarily accepted by a great power."<sup>1310</sup> The members of parliament, however, counseled caution. Neville Chamberlain, the chancellor of the exchequer, warned "that this is not an occasion when there is any need for anybody to get into a panic. This is a time when people should keep cool heads and not jump to any hasty conclusions."<sup>1311</sup> Some members demonstrated that Hitler's intuition about British aversion for the Franco-Soviet pact had been quite correct. In the House of Lords, Lord Ranekeillour said that "it is quite unthinkable that we should ever be led into war because of the commitments of some other country to Russia."<sup>1312</sup> Many felt that Hitler really wanted peace. Viscount Philip Snowden, a former cabinet minister in Labour governments "concentrated upon the proposed non-aggression pact (offered by Hitler), and said that Hitler's previous peace overtures had been ignored, but the peoples would not permit *this* peace offer to be neglected."<sup>1313</sup> Other members

<sup>1309</sup> H. C. Deb., 5s., 1810-1813; Anthony Eden, *Foreign Affairs* (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 84-90; *The Annual Register, 1936*, edited by M. Epstein (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1937), CLXXVIII, 20-21. Italics mine.

<sup>1310</sup> H. C. Deb., 5s., 1867.

<sup>1311</sup> *Ibid.*, 2081.

<sup>1312</sup> 100 *House of Lords Debates*, 5th Series (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), 185.

<sup>1313</sup> Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 194.

tried to understand the Nazi movement. Clement Atlee, the leader of the Labour opposition, said that he was aware of the existence of dictators and fascist movements on the continent, but that "behind these movements are real difficulties which will have to be faced in every country in the world." He implored the government to "make a new start and try to deal with the causes of war."<sup>17</sup> Some members of parliament even expressed sympathy for the Germans. The Bishop of London contended that "the Germans are a very kindly people and very sensitive to kind treatment. We made the greatest mistake about Germany after the war." The Germans, he said, "were getting encircled, and therefore had some excuse for saying that they would not stand by the Locarno Treaty."<sup>18</sup> Lloyd George, the independent Liberal and famous war-time minister, even went so far as to express an anti-French attitude. "I do not think," he said, "that France is in a position to point the finger of scorn at Germany on the ground of Treaty-breaking . . . Germany has broken a Treaty, but in a court of equity she could call evidence which any judge would say provided some mitigation of her folly."<sup>19</sup> Lord Lothian characterized another typical view held by parliament when he said: "After all, they are only going into their own back-garden."<sup>20</sup> Above all, the members of parliament were anxious that Hitler's peace proposals be examined in lieu of taking any immediate, forceful action against Germany. Sir Archibald Sinclair, the leader of the Liberal party, stated that he was in "general agreement with the substance of the statement of policy" made by Eden. Two features of this statement struck him "as particularly important and gratifying. The first was that the Government had definitely decided to examine Herr Hitler's proposals, and the second, that all decisions are to be taken at Geneva."<sup>21</sup> Thus, the reaction of both houses of parliament was much like that of the government. Germany had violated a freely negotiated treaty, but no hasty action should be taken. Maybe the Germans were really sincere in wanting peace. The Germans might even have right on their side; after all, they were only occupying their own territory. In any event, the new "peace proposals" offered by Hitler should be carefully examined in order to see if any hope for peace could be found in them.

At least one speaker in parliament proved the exception to this general pattern of views being expressed. Although a Conservative, Winston Churchill followed his attitude at that time "of severe though friendly criticism of Government policy."<sup>22</sup> He urged that Britain's defenses be strengthened to the utmost. A terrible dilemma, he warned, faced the

<sup>17</sup>309 H. C. Deb., 5s., 1852.

<sup>18</sup>99 H. L. Deb., 5s., 967-968.

<sup>19</sup>109 H. C. Deb., 5s., 2035-2036.

<sup>20</sup>Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 196-197.

<sup>21</sup>309 H. C. Deb., 5s., 1862-1863.

<sup>22</sup>Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 200.

German government. If it continued its present policy of rearmament, there was every prospect of bankruptcy. If it stopped, Germany would have countless unemployed persons. "Germany will have to choose between the internal and the external, and can we doubt which course the man at the head of Germany will choose?"<sup>309</sup>

The views of the British Communists were even more diametrically opposed to the general pattern than Churchill's. The Communist party represented only a very small minority in Britain, but their opinion should be noted, since it does contrast so sharply with the usual pattern of opinion and since in the end their view proved to be accurate. The Communists contended that if France and Britain negotiated any new agreement with Hitler, it would be just as unstable as the old agreements and "would be concluded by Germany merely to hoodwink the Western Powers and enable her to launch an offensive in the east."<sup>310</sup> The Communists "were of the opinion that there was still time to save Europe from the danger of an aggressive war if a resolute stand were made now but that it would be too late to check Herr Hitler in the next emergency."<sup>311</sup>

The average Britisher was not impressed by these warnings of the Communists. The unofficial opinion of the average British citizen was given expression in the newspapers, periodicals, letters to the editor, and opinion surveys immediately following March 7. The staid, conservative *Times* set the pattern which the others were to follow. The editors of the *Times* stated that the German action was "plainly the breach of a Treaty freely negotiated and constantly reaffirmed." A distinction, however, should be drawn between German troops "sent to reoccupy territory indisputably under German sovereignty, and, an act which carries fire and sword into a neighbour's territory." France and Britain should "take a steady measure of the undertakings which Germany has offered in extenuation."<sup>312</sup> The *Manchester Guardian*, a representative of Liberal opinion, stood almost alone among the press in suggesting that if Germany was only interested in securing legal equality, she "might honourably withdraw (her) troops of occupation" from the Rhineland while negotiations were proceeding.<sup>313</sup> An expression of the pacifist attitude of the Labour party was given in its press organ, the *Daily Herald*. "Either we negotiate a new settlement," it was asserted, "or we deliberately begin a new war in order to prevent German troops from garrisoning German towns." "Surely the problem has only to be stated for the decision to be obvious . . . War is out of the question."<sup>314</sup>

<sup>309</sup> H. C. Deb., 5s., 2008-2009.

<sup>310</sup> *The Times* (London), March 10, 1936, 15.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, March 11, 1936, 16.

<sup>312</sup> Issue of March 9, 1936, 15.

<sup>313</sup> Issue of March 9, 1936, 10.

<sup>314</sup> Issue of March 9, 1936, 8.

The wearying quality of sameness shown in the editorials of the "big three" of British newspapers was continued in those papers with smaller circulations. Their opinions varied only in the intensity and the tone with which the views were expressed. In the London *News Chronicle* it was predicted that "Herr Hitler's 'symbolic occupation' will not be regarded by a single Englishman as constituting sufficient ground for supporting French punitive measures against Germany."<sup>20</sup> The editors of the *Yorkshire Post*, a conservative-minded paper of Leeds, had more insight into Hitler's action than their fellows. "We believe," they said, "that Herr Hitler has depended to a very large extent upon the known desire of the Government and people of this country to seek peace . . . and in all circumstances to prefer conciliation and negotiation to the pre-War method of replying to provocation."<sup>21</sup> The muddle-headedness of the *Daily Mail* was demonstrated in its categorical statement that the violation of the Rhineland "has caused no crisis, and in reality has made no substantial change in conditions."<sup>22</sup> A representative Scotch opinion was given by the Edinburgh *Scotsman*, in which it was stated: "Protest there must be, but nothing should be done that might result in making the European crisis more delicate and dangerous than it is."<sup>23</sup> Lord Rothermere's *Sunday Dispatch*, a representative of the more sensational press, was almost shameless when, on March 8, it proclaimed: "The Locarno Pact is dead. It was a commitment in which the people of Britain never gave their sanction. It was made by the government of the day without any mandate from the electorate. It goes unhonored and unsung into the tomb of past political errors."<sup>24</sup>

The pattern of opinion thus laid down in the daily newspapers was reiterated, with some variations, in the periodical literature. The *Contemporary Review*, an organ of conservative views, would make it "indispensable that Hitler's act should be formally condemned" before "taking up the more or less constructive proposals by which he sought to mitigate" his treaty-breaking.<sup>25</sup> The *New Statesman and Nation*, which represented liberal and radical opinion, admitted that Hitler's move violated a treaty freely signed and reaffirmed by Hitler himself, but it was insisted, even this grave consideration "does not justify a refusal to discuss Hitler's proposals."<sup>26</sup> The extremely reactionary, almost facist, *Saturday Review* broke the pattern thus far presented with some rather

<sup>20</sup>Issue of March 9, 1936, 10.

<sup>21</sup>*The Times* (London), March 10, 1936, 18.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>24</sup>Schuman, *Europe on the Eve*, 216-217; Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, 58.

<sup>25</sup>Wickham Steed, "The Outlook," *The Contemporary Review*, CXLIX (April, 1936), 392.

<sup>26</sup>"Is There a Way to Peace?" *The New Statesman and Nation*, XI (March 14, 1936), 372-373.

amazing statements. It asked: "Why should men rally to the Colours under our present regime of woolly-minded Parliamentarians whose policies are to inevitably drag Britain to the chariot wheels of Russia? Why should the youth of Britain prepare to immolate itself on the black altar of Geneva?" One blinks with amazement as he reads in this journal that Stanley Baldwin "has leaned far more heavily towards Bolshevism than towards a robust nationalism, despite the label of his Government."<sup>24</sup>

The attitude of the *Saturday Review* was, however, not the opinion of the average Britisher. A perusal of the letters to the editor in the *Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* following March 7 indicates that the average citizen wanted peace and welcomed Hitler's "generous offer" as a talking point. Germany's lawlessness was condemned, but the British public did not wish to do anything about it. After all, the Germans were only reoccupying their own soil. A public opinion poll conducted by the *News Chronicle* on March 10 revealed some interesting opinions from the "man-on-the-street." A barber said that he did not "agree with a lot that Hitler had done . . . but that's no reason why we should have a war with him. If they wanted me they'd have to fetch me." A paint manufacturer approved of Hitler's move as "a definite step towards clearing up the fantastic situation created by the Versailles Treaty." A milkman said that "if France wants to fight Germany, let her get on with it. We had enough trouble helping her out of her difficulties in 1914."<sup>25</sup> Obviously, the British public did not understand the significance of Hitler's *coup de main* in the Rhineland. "Stories of the ill-treatment of British soldiers by the French population" during World War I were raked up. The French occupation of the Ruhr was brought up again. Thus, France became the villain of the piece and Hitler the hero.<sup>26</sup>

This then was the British reaction to the remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. It was exactly the way Hitler had expected Britain to react. The question that next poses itself is why the British reacted as they did. One must conclude that their reaction was almost inevitable due to the confused state of the average British mind. For about ten years the British public had been subjected to anti-French and pro-German propaganda in regard to the peace treaty of Versailles.<sup>27</sup> This was accompanied by extreme appeals for pacifism, as manifested in the disarmament conferences of the 1920's, the Oxford movement, and the peace ballot of the 1930's. German sympathy and pacifism instilled

<sup>24</sup>"They Want Our Young Men to Fight—But for What and for Whom?" *The Saturday Review*, CLXI (March 14, 1936), 324; Kim, "What a Man!" *ibid.*, 329. Unfortunately, there was no Labour party periodical available for analysis.

<sup>25</sup>*News Chronicle* (London), March 10, 1936, 10.

<sup>26</sup>Alexander Werth, *Which Way France?* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1937), 228.

<sup>27</sup>Douglas Jerrold, *Britain and Europe 1900-1940* (London: Collins, 1941), 129.

in British minds during the years following 1920 made realistic and dynamic diplomacy in 1936 impossible.<sup>40</sup> The idealistic Liberals who believed that Germany had been the victim of foul play favored concessions to the *Reich*. Concessions were also favored by the Conservatives who preferred facism to communism "and who would not oppose a German-Soviet conflict on the theory of dog eat dog."<sup>41</sup> British policy was also complicated by the fact that Britain had possessions and commitments scattered around the world, and the British did not want to dissipate all of their resources on the continent of Europe.<sup>42</sup>

The issue was clearly joined in March, 1936. Either Britain should decide to support the French in taking strong measures against Germany or else it should allow the matter to be talked to death in the already repudiated League of Nations. The British people and their government expressed themselves unmistakably in favor of the latter alternative. But what was the significance of this British reaction on the final outcome of the Rhineland crisis? After the French decided to take no action, the whole Rhineland crisis degenerated into a deluge of meaningless verbiage. Winston Churchill has said: "More than once in these fluid years French Ministers in their ever-changing Governments were content to find in British pacifism an excuse for their own."<sup>43</sup> Regardless of what the French government should have done, the fact remains that no French government "was in a position to adopt a course repugnant to Britain, whose friendship remained the cornerstone of France's foreign policy."<sup>44</sup> France might have decided to act alone in the Rhineland in the hope that Britain would be forced to support her, but her "memories of isolated action in the Ruhr were bitter, and made unlikely the repetition of extreme measures."<sup>45</sup> By the British reaction French indecision was made into decision. The British attitude thus must be considered to have been the significant factor in determining the outcome of the Rhineland crisis.<sup>46</sup> Because of the British tendency toward isolation and the consequent French failure to take action, Hitler was not stopped when it would have been easy to stop him. Ralph Wigram, a young British foreign office official, saw the significance of this failure: "War is now inevitable," he said, "and it will be the most terrible war there has ever been."<sup>47</sup>

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 129; Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1936), 279.

<sup>41</sup>Vera M. Dean, *Europe in Crisis* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1938), 41.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 42.

<sup>43</sup>Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 194.

<sup>44</sup>Dean, *Europe in Crisis*, 42.

<sup>45</sup>Cameron, *Prologue to Appeasement*, 197.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 196-197; Brogan, *Modern France*, 701.

<sup>47</sup>Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 198.

Here, then, is one example of the British isolationist attitude and the consequences which it entailed. It is only one example of many that could be given, but it does raise several provocative questions which are in the minds of all of us today. Is Britain displaying today the same isolationist tendency which allowed Adolf Hitler in 1936 to lay the foundation for the conflagration of 1939? Is it desirable that Britain maintain no more than a loose connection with the continent as she did with such disastrous results in the 1930's? Or, is it desirable that she co-operate very closely with the western states of Europe as the United States now desires? It was a Conservative government that allowed the post-World War I security system to crumble into nothingness. Will it act any differently now that it once again governs Britain? Will Churchill follow a policy which he vehemently condemned in the 1930's? These questions cannot be answered by the historian. They must be answered by the people of Britain themselves in the light of their own national interests and in the light of security and preservation for free, liberal democracy. This democracy is once again challenged by a despicable totalitarianism. We can only hope that the men who lead Britain today will find answers more profitable for the cause of freedom than those chosen in March, 1936, proved to be.

## The "Good Neighbor" Tested: 1938

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### *The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention*

During the nine months preceding the opening of the Lima Conference in 1938, the Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt administration was subjected to a severe test in Mexico. In the meantime, the prospect for peaceful settlement of the European international problems became less promising. The growth of Nazi and Fascist organizations in the Latin American countries, the increasing tempo of foreign propaganda, and the extraordinary efforts of the Germans to develop trade had caused increasing uneasiness in Washington. The policy of securing hemispheric solidarity thus became a vital one in 1938. The Roosevelt administration hoped to use it as a means of strengthening the United States security system against possible aggressions from the totalitarian powers in the New World.

Mexico had provided a long trial of the sincerity and patience of the Good Neighbor of the North. Since 1915 the Mexican government had been expropriating properties of United States citizens, for which no adequate compensations were made. After the inauguration of the Good Neighbor policy, there is some reason to believe that the Mexican authorities hastened their program of expropriation of foreign-owned properties. At least, they had less fear concerning direct intervention from the big neighbor of the North. Following the renunciation of the policy of intervention by the United States at the Montevideo Conference in 1933, the Roosevelt administration attempted to make it clear to the Latin Americans that there would be no intervention for the purpose of protecting nationals and their property abroad. At the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936 the United States delegation accepted, without reservation, the Additional Protocol Relative to Nonintervention. By the ratification of this pact the republic of the North was then committed to the doctrine of nonintervention in its most absolute form. Under this Protocol the American republics declared "inadmissible the intervention of any of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." Thus it appeared that the southern countries would have little to fear from the United States.

### *The Church Question in Mexico*

On December 1, 1934, Lazaro Cárdenas became president of the Mexican Republic. He had been elected on a platform pledged to carry out the social and economic reforms inaugurated by the Revolution of 1910-1920, and had received the overwhelming support of the laboring

classes. Cárdenas had passed his early years in a peasant environment and could be described as a "self-made man."

At the beginning of 1938, President Cárdenas had been in office less than four years, but within this short period, he probably had done more than all his predecessors since 1920 in carrying out the program of the Revolution. In carrying out this program, Cárdenas had encountered strong opposition from powerful groups both inside and outside his country.

The Roman Catholic Church furnished probably the most effective opposition to the Cárdenas program within Mexico. And it was the church controversy that came to provide one of the first tests of the Roosevelt Good Neighbor policy there. The Catholic Church, unable to reconcile itself to the restrictions imposed upon it by the Mexican government, sought assistance in the United States. Since 1933, when he had gone to Mexico City as United States Ambassador, Josephus Daniels had followed a correct policy of nonintervention with regard to the church question. As a result, he was accused later by the head of the Knights of Columbus in the United States as being "hand-in-glove with the Mexican government to stamp out religion."<sup>1</sup> From 1934 to 1936 President Roosevelt received numerous letters requesting intervention in Mexico on behalf of the Catholic Church.<sup>2</sup> However, there is no evidence of any official intervention on the part of his administration to protect this church south of the Rio Grande.

#### 'Mexico for the Mexicans'

But the most important feature of the Cárdenas program, from the standpoint of its effect on international relations, was the added emphasis on the doctrine of "Mexico for the Mexicans." This revolutionary slogan came to mean, not only the expropriation of the landed estates belonging to the foreigner, but the nationalization of industries that were dependent upon foreign capital and management for their operations. There were few important industries in Mexico which did not fall within this description. To the United States government, the matter became one of great concern. The total investment of United States citizens in Mexico in 1936 was estimated by the Department of Commerce at \$479,000,000.<sup>3</sup> The Brookings Institution, during the previous year, had estimated the value of the oil property in Mexico owned by United States nationals at \$206,000,000.

<sup>1</sup>Copy of personal letter by Josephus Daniels to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (dated February 25, 1936, Mexico City), *Josephus Daniels Papers*, Correspondence of Josephus Daniels with F. D. Roosevelt, 1933-1945. Subsequently, this reference will be cited as *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

<sup>2</sup>These letters are in *The Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers*, Official File, Mexico, Josephus Daniels, 1933-1940.

<sup>3</sup>United States Department of Commerce, *American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries, 1936* (Washington, 1938), Economic Series No. 1.

As a matter of fact, since 1915 Mexico had been expropriating farm lands owned by United States citizens. By 1938, the Mexican authorities had taken over moderate-sized farms belonging to nationals of this country, valued at more than \$10,000,000, for which no compensation had been paid.<sup>5</sup> The larger holdings that had been expropriated were not included in these estimates. These had been owned by only a limited number of individuals. The William R. Hearst family was said to have owned about 1,500,000 acres.<sup>6</sup>

In defense of its seizure of foreign-owned farms the Mexican government stated that it was expropriating the farms of its own nationals along with those of aliens. However, it could offer no such defense in the expropriation of foreign-owned industries where little or no domestic capital was employed. Victims of such action would be almost all foreign.

At the beginning of 1938 it seemed evident that the Cárdenas government had chartered a new course; the program of industrial expropriation was to start in the petroleum industry. The people of Mexico had never reconciled themselves to the private exploitation of their oil reserves by foreign companies.<sup>7</sup> The concessions under which many of the companies operated dated back to the Diaz regime, and in the popular mind, they were associated with those things against which the Revolution of 1910-1920 had been launched. The Mexican workers in the oil fields had staged a series of strikes throughout the year of 1937. They demanded an increase in pay and better housing conditions. Ultimately the Mexican Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration assumed jurisdiction of the labor disputes, and on December 18, 1937, it ruled that the foreign-owned oil companies must increase the wages approximately 27 per cent and improve the pension and welfare system. The oil companies objected that the award not only imposed new obligations beyond their financial capacity, but that in certain respects it deprived them of their right to manage their own business. They thus sought a permanent injunction. However, the Mexican Supreme Court upheld the award, and the Federal Labor Board declared the new wage scale would become effective on March 7, 1938. When the oil companies refused to comply with the decree of the Federal Labor Board, President Cárdenas, on March

<sup>5</sup>Cleona Lewis, *America's Stake in International Investments: A Report Prepared by the Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution* (Washington, 1938), p. 230.

<sup>6</sup>The Secretary of State (Hull), to the Mexican Ambassador at Washington (Castillo Nájera), July 21, 1938, S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Meyers, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (8 vols., Boston, 1939-1947), I, p. 89.

Hereafter this reference will be cited as *Documents on American Foreign Relations*.

<sup>7</sup>Copy of personal letter by Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt (dated August 5, 1938, Mexico City), in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

<sup>8</sup>Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs, *The United States in World Affairs, 1938* (New York, 1939), p. 229.

18, announced that the oil properties would be nationalized and indemnification made to the owners within ten years.<sup>9</sup>

In the meantime, Ambassador Daniels revealed a sympathetic attitude toward the Mexicans. Four days after the expropriation decree, he wrote President Roosevelt:

The feeling here harks back to the days when Doheny and Pearson obtained oil leases for a song from the corrupt Diaz government and when the oil companies had backed Huerta and the United States refused to recognize Mexico unless it upheld the subsoil ownership of oil and silver by Americans. These things have rankled and when the foreign oil companies (Britain owns 70 percent, and Americans 30 percent) refused to follow the award upheld by the Supreme Court, the Government declared them in rebellion against the laws and courts of Mexico and took the extreme step of invoking the expropriation law. The country by a large majority is with President Cárdenas and will remain so unless loss of employment and reduced wages bring hunger. You know that most revolutions are bred in hunger and privation.<sup>10</sup>

On March 27, Secretary Hull submitted a note to the Mexican government, inquiring what specific action it contemplated with respect to the payment of American oil interests.<sup>11</sup> Three days later the Secretary repeated in a public statement the substance of the note:

This government has not undertaken and does not undertake to question the right of the government of Mexico in the exercise of its sovereign power to expropriate properties within its jurisdiction. The recent expropriation by the Mexican government of oil properties belonging to American citizens is but one incident in a long series of incidents of this character and accordingly raises no new question. The subject now under consideration between the government of Mexico is the matter of compensation for various properties of American citizens expropriated in the past few years. It is my earnest hope that because of the very friendly relations existing between the two governments a fair and equitable solution of this problem may soon be found by the Mexican government.<sup>12</sup>

The first official Mexican statement concerning the expropriation was reassuring to the Washington government. President Cárdenas informed Daniels that "Mexico will know how to honor its obligations of today and its obligations of yesterday":

Mexico has always wished to maintain its prestige, carrying out its obligations, but elements which did not understand Mexico placed obstacles in the way of its

<sup>9</sup>Of the seventeen companies whose properties were expropriated, four belonged to the British-controlled Royal-Dutch Shell group. The remainder were owned by concerns in the United States. These were mostly subsidiaries of the Standard Oil of California, the Standard Oil of New Jersey, and the Sinclair interests. The Cárdenas expropriation decree ultimately caused a severance of diplomatic relations between Mexico and Great Britain.

<sup>10</sup>Copy of letter from Josephus Daniels, United States Ambassador to Mexico, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (dated March 22, 1938, Mexico City), in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

<sup>11</sup>Mexican Expropriation of American Properties, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, I, p. 90.

<sup>12</sup>Secretary Hull's Statement Concerning the Expropriation of American Properties, U. S. Department of State, *Press Releases*, XVIII, April 2, 1938, p. 435.

high and noble purpose. Today a new dawn breaks on its future with the opening to it of the doors of opportunity. You may be sure, Mr. Ambassador, that Mexico will know how to honor its obligations of today and its obligations of yesterday.<sup>13</sup>

About a week after the U. S. Department of State had sent the note of March 27, recognizing the right of Mexico to expropriate the oil properties, *El Nacional* (Mexico City) editorialized:

Came Roosevelt, the most popular president that country has had since the Civil War . . . upholding the banner of democracy. He established new bonds between the organs of power and the governed majorities, and gave the sense of democracy that Lincoln set forth in his famous "Gettysburg" address. He inaugurated his "good neighbor" policy because he knows that they err who place power upon the basis of arbitrariness and despoliation. The real greatness of democratic communities is that which rests upon mutual respect and on the wholesome development of the positive forces of each.<sup>14</sup>

However, it soon became apparent that the Roosevelt administration was confronted with an unpleasant dilemma. As time went on the Mexican authorities made no attempt to compensate those foreigners who had been dispossessed of their properties. The United States had not denied that Mexico had a right to expropriate foreign-owned properties, but had insisted that expropriation without prompt and effective compensation meant confiscation. The Mexican officials denied that the property had been confiscated. The question seemed to revolve around the valuation of the property and ways and means of paying for it.

At first it appeared that the Roosevelt administration might retaliate against the southern neighbor by the stoppage of silver purchases. But Ambassador Daniels disapproved of this policy. An order was issued in March to cease the purchase of silver from the Mexicans, and Daniels wrote the President: "Your Good Neighbor policy, the noblest conception of preserving unity in the Western Hemisphere in a mad world, is in danger."<sup>15</sup> The Roosevelt Administration could not censure the Mexicans too severely without running the risk of discrediting its professions of the Good Neighbor among the Latin American republics. But more serious still, the administration's program of hemispheric solidarity, which it had been developing so assiduously, might be jeopardized.

#### *Criticism of the Good Neighbor Policy in the United States With Reference to the Mexican Situation*

The Roosevelt policy in Mexico brought forth criticisms from both the liberal and conservative groups. Some journals of liberal opinion which ordinarily approved of the administration's domestic policy, now ardently supported Mexico against their own government. They criticized the

<sup>13</sup>Note of President Cardenas to the United States Ambassador to Mexico, March 31, 1938, U. S. Department of State, *Press Releases*, XVIII, April 2, 1938, p. 436.

<sup>14</sup>Editorial, "A New Dawn Over the Democracies," *El Nacional* (Mexico City), April 4, 1938.

<sup>15</sup>Copy of letter written by Josephus Daniels to President F. D. Roosevelt (dated March 29, 1938, Mexico City), in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

Department of State for raising the expropriation issue at all and applauded Mexico's refusal to "knuckle under."<sup>15</sup> At the same time conservatives criticized the Department of State for lack of firmness in dealing with the Mexican oil and land disputes. There was also a belief that the Mexican practices would tend to strengthen the influence of the totalitarian powers in the Western Hemisphere. Two weeks after Cárdenas issued the oil properties expropriation decree, Congressman E. M. Dirksen said:

... I deem it most proper that the Congress take cognizance of this situation and let the light shine ... With Japanese domination developing in a nation which is right under our nose; with a safe haven for Trotsky and his apostles at our very doorstep; with a powerful radio station in Mexico to pour propaganda into this country; with the expropriation of the oil properties of our own citizens so that Japan might control the oil supply of Mexico; with the prospect of Japanese engineers streamlining and speeding up industrial production in Mexico, with Japanese capital and Japanese labor to overwhelm our own markets; with the prospects of the expropriation of American interests in Mexican railroads and mineral properties, also with Japanese assistance, there has developed an acute situation that requires immediate and vigorous action.<sup>16</sup>

A few weeks later Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York asserted:

I am unable to understand the weak and vacillating attitude of President Roosevelt in not demanding the restoration of American property or full indemnity for damages, which could be the only satisfactory settlement. If we continue to procrastinate, our citizens will probably lose everything, or obtain agrarian bonds as they have in the past, which are and will be utterly valueless.

It is beginning to look as if the good-neighbor policy has blown up, and has become a boomerang, encouraging the seizure of American property and the spread of Mexican communism throughout South and Central America, which is bound to cause a severe set-back to the promotion of our friendly trade relations with Latin America.<sup>17</sup>

On August 16, *The New York Times* asserted:

... under the Roosevelt administration the people of the United States have been subsidizing the people of Mexico by buying their silver at a wholly artificial price, while the Government of Mexico has been busily taking over American properties by a method which our own Government now accurately describes as confiscation. In these circumstances the Mexican Government has chosen to interpret the Good Neighbor policy as a go-ahead signal to complete its social revolution in the shortest possible manner without regard for foreigners whose legitimate interests are involved.<sup>18</sup>

A few weeks later, Lawrence Dennis, who was associated with a banking firm in New York, wrote:

<sup>15</sup>Editorial, *The Nation*, CXLVII, September 10, 1938, p. 234.

<sup>16</sup>"What About Mexico? Extension of Remarks of Honorable Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois in the House of Representatives, Saturday, April 2, 1938," *Congressional Record*, Appendix, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, LXXXIII (Washington, 1938), pp. 1290-1291.

<sup>17</sup>"The Good-Neighbor Policy in Mexico; Extension of Remarks of Honorable Hamilton Fish of New York in the House of Representatives, June 16, 1938," *Ibid.*, p. 2982.

<sup>18</sup>"Good Neighborliness," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1938, p. 18.

Events in Mexico and throughout Latin America are at least revealing the much-heralded Good Neighbor policy for just what it is—futile incense burned by the State Department before the altars of Liberalism and Internationalism. This perfumed smoke screen has hitherto successfully masked the steady retreat before the wave of anti-Americanism and anti-Capitalism which has been gathering momentum ever since 1927 when Dwight Morrow made a reputation for himself by an almost complete surrender of American rights . . . Today, through the haze of the Good Neighbor incense, the indubitable facts of the secular trend in Latin America toward anti-Americanism and anti-Capitalism are becoming all too apparent.<sup>19</sup>

Dennis suggested that the Washington government follow a more vigorous policy south of the border:

. . . our only hope in Latin America lies in developing governments more respectful of our rights and more amenable to our demands . . . We must accept the responsibilities of power. Where we impose respect for our rights, we must also impose respect for human rights. The destiny of the strong is to rule . . . We must obey the commands of our destiny, or renounce it. By the Good Neighbor policy we are renouncing it.<sup>20</sup>

In the meantime Ambassador Daniels urged the Roosevelt administration to adhere consistently to the professions of the Good Neighbor policy. Early in June he wrote the President:

It (the Mexican oil expropriation problem) is a hard nut to crack and will call for wisdom and patience. In my judgment, if we do not permit any debt collecting policy to hamper its success, your Good Neighbor policy will shine for all time among the greatest achievements of your administration, if not the most notable. If we should do aught resembling a Big Stick policy with Mexico, that great dream, which I share with you, will be imperilled (sic) . . . I strongly believe that our commitment at Buenos Aires, not to "directly or indirectly intervene in the affairs of another country," is our chart and compass, and that conciliatory policies are essential in the present situation. This debacle could have been averted if the oil companies had not been so adamant in their refusal to obey the decree of the Supreme Court.<sup>21</sup>

#### *Ambassador Daniels Becomes Disturbed*

During the summer of 1938, the Department of State exerted strong pressure upon the Mexican government to settle the controversy arising over the expropriation of the foreign-owned property. It stressed particularly the importance of reaching an early settlement with the "small farmers" who had lost their lands. On April 19 the Foreign Office at Mexico City indicated its willingness to make small payments toward the settlement of a few specific claims.<sup>22</sup> This offer did not satisfy the

<sup>19</sup>Lawrence Dennis, "What Price Good Neighbor," *The American Mercury*, XLV, October, 1938, p. 150. Mr. Dennis had served as *chargé d'affaires* in Honduras and Nicaragua from 1920 to 1927; and at the time of the writing of the above article he was associated with J. and W. Seligman, Bankers, New York City.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>21</sup>Copy of personal letter written by Josephus Daniels, United States Ambassador to Mexico, to President F. D. Roosevelt (dated June 4, 1938, Raleigh, N.C.), in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

<sup>22</sup>Mexican Expropriation of American Properties, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, I, p. 90.

United States, and on June 29, the Washington government presented a detailed statement of the outstanding claims for small farms, formerly belonging to United States nationals, which had been taken over since 1927.<sup>28</sup> Along with this statement it also suggested a method for appraising the value of these properties and asked that partial payments be made while the valuations were in progress. In its reply, on July 15, the Mexican government stated that it had not contemplated "covering entirely, during the present presidential term, the amount of the properties expropriated, much less has it undertaken, nor can it undertake to proceed in such manner."<sup>29</sup> On July 21, after the receipt of this note, Secretary Hull sent the strongest reply that he had yet submitted to the Mexican government. After reviewing the long series of expropriations, which began in 1915, and the repeated efforts of the United States government to effect a settlement on a basis of "fair dealing and fair play based on law and justice," he stated emphatically:

The taking of properties without compensation is not expropriation. It is confiscation. It is no less confiscation because there may be an expressed intent to pay at some time in the future.<sup>30</sup>

The Secretary, in the note also proposed arbitration to decide whether Mexico had complied with the rule of compensation prescribed by international law in the case of the lands expropriated since 1927.

In his reply, Eduardo Hay, the Mexican Foreign Minister, stated that arbitration should be reserved for cases "of irreducible differences" and that the issues in this case had not yet reached such a stage.<sup>31</sup> He challenged Hull's interpretation of the rights of United States citizens under international law. Hay maintained that the expropriations were of a "general and impersonal" nature, applying to nationals and foreigners alike, and that in such cases there was no rule in international law which called for immediate or even deferred compensation. He admitted that Mexico was obligated under her own laws to make payments, but the Foreign Minister insisted that the time and manner of payment were for his country alone to determine.

During this time Josephus Daniels seems to have served as a restraining agency upon the administration's Mexican policy. By his constant insistence that the spirit and letter of the Good Neighbor policy be observed, the Ambassador probably influenced the administration to follow a less aggressive policy. A week after the strongly-worded note of July 21, Daniels told President Roosevelt that the Good Neighbor policy was the only hope of peaceful relations, and that the Washington govern-

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>31</sup>The Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hay) to the American Ambassador at Mexico City (Daniels), August 3, 1938, *Ibid.*, p. 97.

ment should not become a debt collecting agency for United States citizens in Mexico:

I am as certain as I am of anything that your Good Neighbor policy is the only hope of permanent friendly relations, increase of commerce, and the sound basis of amity and peace. And I am equally confident that with all its essential virtues it is doomed to go on the rocks if one nation, particularly a strong nation, undertakes to be a debt collecting agency for its nationals who elect to go into other countries to engage in business while retaining their American citizenship. Our trouble in Mexico today grows out of the insistence by native or naturalized citizens that our Government compel the country where they have gone to get gain to guarantee them protection in their investments over and above what natives of the country receive. Many of the American investors and business men here have lived here half a century. In no way do they contribute to the country whose protection they claim, they never vote, they pay no taxes, and yet if they feel their dollars are endangered in the least or overtaxed or this country requires them to pay higher wages than formerly, they feel justified in demanding that every resource of our country, for which they have done nothing, when they sought greener fields or profit than they found in the United States, be invoked for their benefit. This, too, when they have incorporated their business under Mexican law and solemnly agreed that in case of any difference between them and the government of the country in which they do business they will observe the Calvo Clause and not appeal to their country for diplomatic assistance. That is practically the position of every oil company, every mining company, every land company, and every business in which men holding American citizenship do business in Mexico.<sup>77</sup>

*The New York Times* on August 16, as previously indicated, advised the Roosevelt administration "to spank" Mexico publicly for her negligence in the payment of claims to those who were dispossessed of their property by the expropriation decrees. Daniels subsequently sent the following message to President Roosevelt as a reply to the editorial and also as another rejoinder to the Hull note of July 21:

Spanking a nation that is desperately poor in public on account of debts, when there is not even a slap on the wrist for great countries that ignore their obligations, is a severe strain on the Good Neighbor policy. Here in Mexico the American colony (all but a few were loud in support of Landon and regard the Good Neighbor policy as poison) regard this note (Hull note of July 21) as a precursor to a stronger one on oil. Much of the trouble here and in the United States is caused by oil propaganda. It goes to the extent of having filling station operators in Texas to warn people "it is unsafe to go to Mexico, for a revolution is imminent." The truth is the opposite, and yet oil men are seeking to bring about the overturn of Cárdenas by predicting it. Nothing would satisfy them except adopting the old Elihu Root and Lansing policy of the Big Stick and marines here to camp on all property claimed by Americans.<sup>78</sup>

Continuing to show deep concern over the possibility of further strained relations between his country and Mexico, Ambassador Daniels, four days later, sent the President another message:

I am greatly disturbed about the situation that has arisen over the controversy which has followed the expropriation of lands and oil fields. My heart's desire in

<sup>77</sup>Original manuscript of letter written by Josephus Daniels to President F. D. Roosevelt (dated July 30, 1938, Mexico City) in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

<sup>78</sup>Copy of personal letter written by Josephus Daniels to President F. D. Roosevelt (dated August 27, 1938, Mexico City), in *Ibid.*

the service I have sought to render here has been to undergird your Good Neighbor policy. With a world on the verge of war, in fact portions of it at war, I feel that the success of your foreign policy and the good of our country depends upon the unity and friendship of the Pan American countries. Your friendly words and actions, replacing Dollar Diplomacy and the Big Brother policies with one of genuine brotherhood, changed the feeling until Mexicans, either long suspicious or mimical to "Gringoes" came to feel that they could rely upon you to understand their problems and sympathize with them in their aspirations. It would be a calamity if that good feeling should be broken. It has already been disturbed and placed in jeopardy.<sup>29</sup>

The Ambassador believed that a continuation of the Good Neighbor policy in Mexico would ultimately mean good customers for the United States, and would help to preserve a hope for the drifting world:

The goal of Cárdenas is the same as your goal—to give the people here, desperately poor, a living chance. They have erred in expropriating property without payment, and labor often makes excessive demands. Today the Mexican masses as a whole are seeing daylight as never before. Given freedom from revolution and exploitation, another generation (they) will be our best customers. With patience and devotion to the Good Neighbor policy, even when it hurts, we shall preserve on this hemisphere the hope of a drifting world.<sup>30</sup>

Then in September as the agenda for the Lima Conference was being prepared,<sup>31</sup> Daniels sent the following comments to Secretary Hull:

The compelling reason which has caused me to urge a course of conciliation, even at some sacrifice, is that I believe the Good Neighbor policy must be undergirded if this hemisphere is to escape the contagion that threatens Europe. We were wise in being conciliatory when the press declared that Vargas had set up a Fascist Government in Brazil. We saw that while it was bad for the moment as the Hitler one-man tyranny, it was not imported from Germany, but was a hang-over from the old Spanish (Portuguese?) ways . . . It is ignorance, plus exploitation, that afflicts Mexico and most other countries south of the Rio Grande. In dealing with these countries, which have an inheritance of Spanish foolish pride, we need to exercise the forbearance which is the position of strong nations that would help the weak.<sup>32</sup>

The Ambassador further asserted that the future hope was to be found in the New World "unified for democracy":

The hope of tomorrow is an American continent unified for Democracy. And its achievement calls for more than watchful waiting, overlooking some policies which contravene our ideals, and helping to soften the asperities of those countries on this continent which have yet only a faint apprehension of real democratic government. That is why I have rejoiced to see the multiplication of schools in Mexico . . .<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Copy of personal and confidential letter written by Josephus Daniels to President F. D. Roosevelt (dated August 31, 1938, Mexico City), in *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>*Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, December 9-27, 1928* (Washington, 1939), p. 5.

<sup>32</sup>Copy of personal and confidential letter written by Josephus Daniels to Secretary of State Cordell Hull (dated September 27, 1938, Mexico City), in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*

### *Settlement of the Land Claims*

About a month prior to the opening of the Lima conference, an agreement on the payment of the land claims was reached between Mexico and the United States.<sup>24</sup> In the settlement of this dispute both sides made concessions. The United States did not get the prompt payment which it had demanded. A maximum period of ten years might be permitted before all the claims were liquidated. On the other hand, Mexico conceded the principle of arbitration; whereas three months before she had insisted that the expropriation question was a matter for her own determination, both as to the time and manner.

The claims of the oil companies were not settled in 1938.<sup>25</sup> In the correspondence between the United States and Mexican governments during that year there seems to have been little mention of the oil lands.

### *Conclusion*

It appears that the reform movement in Mexico, which had been in progress since the Revolution of 1910-1920, was immeasurably hastened and even encouraged by the practical application of the principles of the Good Neighbor policy during the 1930's. However, during the interval the resultant developments provided an extreme test of the good neighbor of the North. Unfortunately the Mexican situation had produced a serious strain in the relations between the United States and its southern neighbor by the mid-summer of 1938, on the eve of the Lima Conference, and at a time when the outlook for world peace seemed dim. The Washington government viewed the matter with grave concern. A policy of hemispheric solidarity had come to be considered of vital importance in the security system of the United States. It had become the difficult task of the Department of State to obtain just treatment for its nationals in Mexico and at the same time to avoid measures which

<sup>24</sup>The Secretary of State (Hull) to the Mexican Ambassador at Washington (Castillo), November 9, 1938, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, I, p. 117; The Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hay) to the American Ambassador at Mexico City (Daniels), November 12, 1938, *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>25</sup>It was not until November 19, 1941, that Secretary Hull announced that an agreement had been reached upon the means of establishing the valuation of the expropriated oil properties. —Exchange of Notes Effectuated at Washington, November 19, 1941, Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, IV, pp. 421-424.

Subsequently two experts (appointed by the United States and Mexican governments, in accordance with the agreement of November 19) announced an evaluation of the expropriated oil properties on April 17, 1942. The total valuation was set at \$23,995,991. These experts recommended that one-third of the total amount should be paid on July 1, 1942, and the remainder to be in five equal installments on July 1 of such subsequent year. —Agreement of Experts on Compensation for Petroleum Properties Expropriated by Mexico, April 17, 1942, *Ibid.*, pp. 425-426.

The United States oil companies ultimately accepted this settlement since there was no alternative.

might estrange not only the Mexicans but the other Latin peoples as well. It is difficult to see how the United States could have followed a different course. A more aggressive policy towards Mexico would have been unwise. It doubtless would have aroused the suspicions and fears of many Latin Americans. Considerable credit is due Ambassador Daniels for his aid in guiding the foreign policy of the administration along lines of moderation. President Roosevelt later remarked that Daniels, . . . . "perhaps, more than anyone else, had exemplified the true spirit of the good neighbor in the foreign field."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Josephus Daniels (dated October 31, 1941, White House), in *Josephus Daniels Papers*.

## Mexican Contract Labor in American Agriculture

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During the nineteenth century, the rising industrial order in the United States was abundantly supplied with cheap labor from Europe. Hampered only by a few minor restrictions, European immigrants streamed unabated into this country from 1864 until 1917. Pressure from organized labor and other groups disadvantageously affected by the great numbers of immigrants, forced Congress to pass the Immigration Law of 1917, which, along with subsequent laws, greatly reduced the number of immigrants entering the United States. These laws were bitterly denounced by industrial employers who predicted dire results for the country, particularly a great shortage of labor. American labor, the employers claimed, would not do the unskilled tasks performed by recently arrived immigrants. As the years passed, however, higher wages and improved working conditions attracted domestic workers into the unskilled jobs once filled only by alien workmen. The wheels of industry continued to turn despite the loss of immigrant labor; and it was not long before the employers became reconciled to the new state of things.

American agriculture, like manufacturing in the nineteenth century, is rapidly becoming industrialized. The "forty acre and a mule" farm is being replaced by the large, highly mechanized farm. As in industry, an agricultural proletariat has developed. This group, like their nineteenth century counterpart in industry, finds itself competing with "cheap foreign labor." Now the alien labor comes not from Europe but from the Western Hemisphere, which was excluded from the restrictions of the Immigration Law of 1917. These foreign workers—from Mexico, Canada, the West Indies—are brought into the country under government supervision to stay for the months they are needed; then they are returned to their respective countries until a new supply of labor is required. All of this occurs to the detriment of domestic agricultural labor. Any suggestion to curtail this seasonal migration of foreign workers is met by arguments from the large farmers reminiscent of those put forth by the industrialists in 1917—that a shortage of labor and a decline in production would be the inevitable results of such a policy.

The first widespread use of Mexican labor in agriculture occurred during World War I. Domestic agricultural workers were drawn into industry as a result of the higher wages and better working conditions. Immediately, cries of "labor shortage" were raised by many agricultural groups in the country. Whether there actually was a severe shortage of farm labor is questionable; certainly a better distribution of the domestic labor force would have eased the shortage. Nevertheless, the increased

war-time demand for food stimulated the government to act. In 1918 more than a thousand Bahamans were admitted for temporary work in the fruit and vegetable industries in Florida.<sup>1</sup> In the same year the Secretary of Labor suspended the head tax payment, the literacy test, and the contract labor provision of the immigration laws to allow the importation of Mexican workers to meet the alleged shortages of labor in Texas, Arizona, and California. This policy of admitting Mexican laborers without restrictions continued until 1921. During this time 72,862 Mexicans were allowed to enter the country.<sup>2</sup>

The end of the war brought no decline in the number of Mexican immigrant workers. From 1908 to 1920 there had been a steady increase, with some fluctuations, in the number of Mexicans entering the country; and during the 1920's, immigration was even greater than in the preceding decade.<sup>3</sup> From 1921 to 1930 459,287 Mexicans entered the country legally,<sup>4</sup> and an untold number came across the border illegally.

This great influx of alien labor was largely the result of increased opportunities for work brought about by the opening of new agricultural areas, particularly the cotton producing areas in the West; the sugar beet industry in the West and Northwest; and the fruit and vegetable industries in the Pacific states, Arizona, Colorado, and South Texas.<sup>5</sup>

The presence of large numbers of alien workers during this period complicated the problem of ridding the deep South and other areas of surplus population. Without the competition of cheap foreign labor numerous domestic workers from these overpopulated areas would have been drawn into the expanded agricultural economy of the West and Southwest.<sup>6</sup> But any plan to restrict the use of foreign labor was vigorously denounced by the large farmers who used such labor. Throughout the 1920's these farm employers, who were well represented in Congress, successfully kept this supply of cheap labor flowing into the country, regardless of its effect upon the domestic labor force.<sup>7</sup>

The depression in the 1930's brought an end to the mass migration of Mexican nationals across our border. With widespread unemployment in this country the growers found an ample supply of domestic workers willing to work under any conditions for any wage. As job opportunities declined in the United States, thousands of Mexicans returned

<sup>1</sup>Darrell H. Smith, *The United States Employment Service* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1923), p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-14.

<sup>3</sup>Clay L. Cochran, "Hired Farm Labor and the Federal Government" (Mimeo-graphed Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of Economics, University of North Carolina, 1950), p. 94.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 93, citing United States Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract, 1948* (Washington: Government Printing Office), Table 116.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

to Mexico. In 1930 some 30,298 Mexican nationals moved through Laredo and some 42,000 more through El Paso.<sup>9</sup> This does not mean that there were no Mexican laborers used in the United States during the depression years; for aliens were still employed on American farms, but the number was so small that they ceased to constitute a major problem.

As America prepared for defense in 1940, agricultural workers again left the farms to work for the higher wages offered industrial labor. Soon shortages of agricultural labor were reported in various areas of the country, and the cry for alien labor was heard once more. The United States Employment Service and the Federal Security Administration, agencies responsible for the distribution of farm labor, refused to sanction the use of foreign workers. Instead, domestic labor was found to meet the shortages.<sup>10</sup> After Pearl Harbor, however, the shortage of labor became more acute; and in 1942 the United States Employment Service, after certifying that a shortage of workers existed in the sugar beet industry, asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service to allow Mexican laborers to enter the country for such work.<sup>11</sup>

The job of securing Mexican workers was not an easy one. The major obstacle was the Mexican Government. Through the years, that government had witnessed the maltreatment of its nationals who had come to the United States to work. In order to insure better treatment of Mexican workers in the future, it had passed legislation regulating the migration of Mexican labor north of the border.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, it took months of negotiating before Mexico finally signed an agreement in August, 1942 with the United States, permitting the contracting of Mexican laborers for use in this country.<sup>13</sup>

Under the terms of the agreement, Mexican workers were to be guaranteed transportation and subsistence to and from their place of employment; they were not to be used for military service nor to replace domestic workers; and they were not to be discriminated against.<sup>14</sup> These were the principle provisions of the agreement. The Mexican Government further stipulated that the Federal Security Administration was to be the agency to supervise the program because of that agency's good record in previous dealings with Spanish-speaking people in the

<sup>9</sup>Carey McWilliams, *Ill Fares the Land* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1942), p. 255.

<sup>10</sup>Cochran, "Hired Farm Labor," p. 157.

<sup>11</sup>Robert C. Jones, "Mexican War Workers in the United States" (Pan American Union, Division of Labor and Social Information: Washington, 1945), p. 1. (Mimeo-graphed.)

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2. Intergovernmental agreements similar to the one with Mexico were negotiated with Bahama, Jamaica, Canada, and other countries of the Western Hemisphere. The number of workers from these countries was not comparable to those from Mexico.

<sup>14</sup>*United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. LVI, Part II, pp. 1766-1767 (1943).

Southwest.<sup>14</sup> The Federal Security Administration was to require all employers to sign individual contracts with the workers, and it was to guarantee the fulfillment, by the employers, of the terms of these contracts. Employers had to agree to pay the workers the prevailing wage, not lower than thirty cents an hour; to employ them only in agricultural work; and to supply them with adequate sanitary housing and medical service.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the agreement promised alien workers much more than domestic labor was getting. The employers were aware of this and were dissatisfied with the arrangement. They were especially opposed to the principle of fixed labor costs in agriculture. What this amounted to was guaranteeing the worker a definite number of days work each season. Previously, the worker had assumed the risk of bad weather and inefficient planning of work, but the international agreement shifted this uncertainty to the shoulders of the employers.<sup>16</sup>

Although the farm employers were dissatisfied with the arrangement, Mexican nationals were used extensively throughout the period of emergency. From 1942 to 1947 about 219,500 "braceros" (workers) entered the country under this program. Most of them were used in the West and Southwest, with California receiving the greatest percentage of the Mexican workers.<sup>17</sup> In 1945 sixty-three percent of the total number of "braceros" used in that year were employed in California. Most of the remaining aliens were employed in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho.<sup>18</sup> Texas was denied the use of contract laborers because of its discriminatory policy toward Latin Americans.<sup>19</sup> However, a great number of Mexicans entered the country illegally to work in the Texas fields.

In 1947 the laws providing for government supervision of the use of foreign workers in agriculture expired, thus terminating the emergency program.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, the demand for alien contract labor was continued by the relatively few but highly articulate growers who had come to rely upon this source of cheap and docile labor. In 1951 the President's Commission on Migratory Labor reported that

... the farm employers who depend to any significant extent on migratory labor ... amount to only approximately 125,000 or two percent of the Nation's farmers. These farms produce less than one-tenth of the value of the national farm output

<sup>14</sup>Jones, "Mexican War Workers," p. 2. Public Law 45 (approved by Congress in April, 1943) shifted the direction of the farm labor program from the Farm Security Administration to the Extension Service and the War Food Administration.

<sup>15</sup>*United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. LVI, Part II, pp. 1766-1767 (1943).

<sup>16</sup>Cochran, "Hired Farm Labor," p. 161.

<sup>17</sup>*Migratory Labor in American Agriculture*, Report of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951) pp. 38-39.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>19</sup>Jones, "Mexican War Workers," see footnote, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup>Daniel Goot, "Employment of Foreign Workers in United States Agriculture," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XXI (July 18, 1949), p. 42.

. . . . From the standpoint of the total agricultural labor supply, migratory labor is not, therefore, a problem on most of the Nation's farms. It is primarily a special concern of a small number of large and highly specialized farm employers.<sup>21</sup>

Statutory authority to admit foreign laborers into the country was found in the ninth proviso of Section 3 of the Immigration Law of 1917. It states:

That the Commissioner General of Immigration with the approval of the Secretary of Labor shall issue rules and prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission.<sup>22</sup>

Using this statute as the legal justification for their demands, agricultural operators urged the government to continue negotiations with Mexico concerning the further importation of Mexican nationals into the country for seasonal agricultural work. As a result, a series of international agreements were signed with Mexico providing for the employment of Mexican workers in the United States. In these agreements, as in those signed during the war years, the Mexican Government insisted upon supervision by the United States Government of the contracting of Mexican workers.<sup>23</sup>

Under the postwar arrangement recruiting points in Mexico were designated where the employer, or his representative, selected the workers he wished to hire. Then, after the workers were examined by United States health authorities, they were transported to the place of employment in conveyances supplied by the employer and approved by the Mexican Government. In the case of noncompliance with the terms of individual work contracts, either on the part of the worker or the employer, the agreements provided for a joint conciliation procedure for investigating any complaint.<sup>24</sup> But the investigation made by the President's Commission on Migratory Labor revealed that the machinery for the adjusting of complaints was cumbersome and that in most cases the workers, upon becoming discontented with their place of employment, preferred to break the contract and move on to other work. The Commission reported that the "complicated procedure, involving several government agencies in general and none in particular, encourages desertion in place of making a complaint because every complaint has the potentiality of being lost or ignored."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup>*Migratory Labor in American Agriculture*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>22</sup>*The Statutes at Large of the United States of America*, Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p. 878 (1917).

<sup>23</sup>*Migratory Labor in American Agriculture*, p. 41. The first of the postwar agreements was signed March 10, 1947. Others were signed on April 2, 1947; February 21, 1948; and August 1, 1949.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 45.

The United States Employment Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were the agencies designated to administer the postwar "bracero" program. The U.S.E.S. was charged with the responsibility of determining the need for foreign workers and of making certain that both the workers and employers abided by the terms of their work contract.<sup>23</sup> The job of the Immigration authorities was to see that the alien worker was returned to Mexico when his period of employment was up or when he deserted his place of employment.<sup>24</sup>

The intergovernmental agreements negotiated after World War II introduced the policy of contracting "wetbacks" or Mexican workers who were in the country illegally. The Mexican Government was aware of the fact that a great number of its citizens were illegally in the United States; therefore, it proposed that the "wetbacks" be placed under contract. Such an act would limit the recruitment of additional "braceros" for work in the United States. Mexican employers favored the policy, for they were opposed to having their labor supply further diminished.<sup>25</sup> In 1947, the first year that "wetbacks" were placed under contract, some 55,000 illegal aliens had their status made legal. Only 19,632 "braceros" were imported from Mexico that year; these along with contract workers remaining from previous years totaled 31,000.<sup>26</sup> Thus, legalized "wetbacks" constituted the majority of Mexican workers in 1947.

The agreement signed in February, 1948, discontinued the policy of legalizing "wetbacks." The program called for the recruitment of "braceros" from the interior of Mexico; however, this plan did not function too well. As a result, a great number of Mexican workers began to accumulate in the vicinity of Juarez, and in October thousands of them crossed the border illegally. Instead of deporting these illegal aliens, the Immigration officials sent them, without the consent of the Mexican Government, to growers who readily employed them.<sup>27</sup> Due to this unauthorized use of Mexican nationals, Mexico abrogated her agreement with the United States.<sup>28</sup>

A new agreement was signed in August, 1949. This agreement renewed the practice of contracting "wetbacks." All "wetbacks" who had entered the United States prior to August 1, 1949, were legalized; these numbered 87,220.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, the number of Mexicans who

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 43-44, 61.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>George I. Sanchez and Lyle Saunders, "Wetbacks," A Preliminary Report to the Advisory Committee Study of Spanish-speaking People, The University of Texas, 1949, pp. 13-15. (Mimeographed.)

<sup>28</sup>"United States and Mexico Sign Agricultural Workers Agreement," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XXI (August 29, 1949), p. 314.

<sup>29</sup>*Migratory Labor in American Agriculture*, p. 53.

were contracted from the interior was decreased; in all they amounted to 19,625.<sup>23</sup> Under an interpretation of the August agreement, the policy of placing "wetbacks" under contract was continued in 1950 through the legalization of all illegal aliens who had entered the country prior to July 27th of that year.<sup>24</sup>

The policy of "legalizing the illegal" has brought about a curious interpretation of our immigration laws. Actually, it places a premium on breaking the laws. Mexicans obeying the laws find themselves discriminated against; for illegal aliens are given preference in employment. In order to avoid abandoning the enforcement of immigration laws completely, a technique was devised to keep the enforcement machinery in operation. "Wetbacks" were picked up by the Immigration officials, brought to the border where they were given identification slips, and then were allowed to step back across the line as legal aliens.<sup>25</sup>

As has been previously noted, from 1947 to 1951 the importation of Mexican contract labor for work in agriculture was carried out under the ninth proviso of Section 3 of the Immigration Law of 1917. The Agriculture Act of 1949 made no provision for implementing the international agreements. Early in 1951, discussion arose as to the need for a federal law to supplement the agreements. The urgency for legislation was due to the fact that the agreement between the United States and Mexico was to expire on June 30th, and Mexico had indicated that it would not be favorable to renewing the agreement unless some federal legislation was passed.<sup>26</sup> Hence, bills to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949 were offered by various members of Congress.

The bill that Congress finally passed was that introduced by Senator Ellender. According to the new law (Public Law 78),

No workers . . . shall be available for employment in any area unless the Secretary of Labor for such area has determined and certified that (1) sufficient domestic workers who are able, willing, and qualified are not available at the time and place needed to perform the work for which such workers are to be employed and (2) the employment of such workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of domestic agricultural workers similarly employed, and (3) reasonable efforts have been made to attract domestic workers for such employment at wages and standard hours of work comparable to those offered to foreign workers.<sup>27</sup>

The law provides for the procurement of farm workers in Mexico by the United States Government and for the establishment of reception

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>"Importation of Foreign Workers," Remarks made by Representative Jones of Missouri on the floor of the House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, XCVII (June 27, 1951), p. 7363.

<sup>27</sup>United States Dept. of Labor, *Information Concerning Entry of Mexican Agricultural Workers to the United States*, Prepared by the Bureau of Employment Security, Farm Placement Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. ii.

centers in the United States to which these workers are to be brought, housed, supplied emergency medical care, and helped in negotiating contracts with American employers. The employers must agree to reimburse the government for expenses incurred in transporting workers to the United States, not to exceed \$15.00 per worker,<sup>13</sup> before Mexican workers will be made available to them. The "bracero" is allowed to turn down offers of employment and to choose the kind of work he desires. Moreover, he is exempt from social security and income taxes, and also the head tax which is levied on immigrants under the Immigration Act of 1917. In addition, the United States Government agrees to be responsible for the employers' abiding by the terms of their contracts.<sup>14</sup> In these contracts the employer must agree to provide the worker with hygienic lodgings; charge the worker not over \$1.75 per day for three meals if the employer furnishes meals; and pay the prevailing wage—not less than what domestic labor gets. The employer must also guarantee, at no cost to the worker, medical care and compensation for injuries sustained while on the job.<sup>15</sup> Under the law "wetbacks" who have lived in the United States for the preceding five years are allowed to remain and be eligible for employment.<sup>16</sup>

The new law is very similar to the legislation passed by Congress during World War II. Once more the government has assumed the responsibility of transporting foreign labor into the country and of supervising the work contracts. And again there has been no provision made for insuring to domestic labor those benefits that are guaranteed to alien workers.

On July 12, 1951 President Truman, for the want of anything better to take its place and because improvements were promised, signed the bill. In his message to Congress approving the law, the President stated that "if promptly followed up by other needed measures, this act can be a first step toward a comprehensive program to bring badly needed improvements in the living and working conditions of migratory farm workers, both foreign and domestic."<sup>17</sup> President Truman's recommendations to Congress were: (1) legislation providing punishment for harboring or concealing aliens who enter the country illegally; (2) authorization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to inspect places of employment without permits; (3) a supplemental appropriation

<sup>13</sup>In June, 1951 Representative McCarthy stated before the House of Representatives that it had cost the government \$76,000,000 during the war to bring in 309,000 foreign workers or \$214 per man. He added that the most recent report of the Farm Replacement Service indicates that it would cost \$34.90 per man for transportation and subsistence. *Congressional Record*, XCVII (June 27, 1951), p. 7368.

<sup>14</sup>U. S. Dept. of Labor, *Entry of Mexican Workers*, pp. ii-iii.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 9-11.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. ii-iii.

<sup>17</sup>The *Congressional Record*, XCVII (July 13, 1951), p. 8332.

to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to increase its personnel so that its work can be speeded up; and (4) additional appropriations for the Farm Placement Service of the Labor Department in order to make possible a better use of our domestic labor force.<sup>43</sup>

The President was especially critical of the provision legalizing the use of "wetbacks." He pointed out that the law hardly considered the "steady stream of illegal immigrants from Mexico, the so-called 'wetbacks'" whose presence has "seriously depressing effect on wages and working conditions in farm areas throughout the Southwest."<sup>44</sup>

The truth of the President's statement is clearly illustrated in the study made by Nelson and Meyers of labor requirements in the Rio Grande Valley. In regard to the effect that widespread employment of Mexican nationals has on wages in that area, they write:

. . . agricultural wages in the Valley are undeniably lower than elsewhere in Texas. For example, at a time (1947) when daily wages for chopping cotton in the Valley were about \$2.25, in the Northeast Sandy Lands of Texas they were \$3.00, in the Corpus Christi and Coast Prairie areas they were \$4.00, in the Rolling Plains \$5.00, and in the High Plains \$5.25. For regular farm work on cotton farms, when the typical daily rate in the Valley was \$2.50, in these other areas of Texas they were from \$3.50 to \$5.00. When tractor drivers earned \$3.00 per day in the Valley, they earned from \$4.00 to \$6.00 elsewhere in Texas. Rates for picking cotton ranged from \$.25 to \$.50 per hundred higher outside the Valley than in it.<sup>45</sup>

Additional evidence was found by the President's Commission that the use of foreign workers adversely affects the wage rates of domestic agricultural labor. In studying the relationship between wage changes and the presence of large numbers of alien workers, it found that during the war, California, using sixty-three percent of the imported Mexican workers, raised its cotton wages one hundred thirty-six percent; whereas Texas, although having a large supply of "wetbacks" but using no contract labor, raised its cotton wages two hundred thirty-six percent. A similar study made of the postwar years showed that during this time, California got eight percent of the Mexican contract workers and raised its cotton wages fifteen percent; while Texas got forty-six percent of the workers and lowered its wages eleven percent.<sup>46</sup> The Commission asserted "that evidence demonstrates that the agencies of Government responsible for importing and contracting foreign labor have not been successful in protecting domestic farm labor from the detrimental effects of imported contract alien labor." It concluded that it had found "alien labor has depressed farm wages and, therefore, has been detrimental to domestic labor."<sup>47</sup>

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 8333-8334.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 8332-8333.

<sup>45</sup>Eastin Nelson and Frederic Meyers, *Labor Requirements and Labor Resources in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas*, (University of Texas: The Study of Spanish-speaking People, 1950), p. 23.

<sup>46</sup>*Migratory Labor in American Agriculture*, pp. 56-58.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

One of the complicating factors in the problem of farm wages is the method of determining the so-called "prevailing wage." The agreement between the United States and Mexico provides that the "bracero" be paid a stipulated minimum wage or the prevailing wage, whichever is the higher. The minimum wage is a nominal rate prescribed in the agreement; the prevailing wage is usually the effective rate. The prevailing wage in most areas is arrived at by the farm employers at a meeting in advance of the season. At this meeting they decide upon the wage they intend to pay during the season—a rate they hope will not be exceeded. This arbitrary wage is determined without consulting government officials or representatives of labor.<sup>16</sup>

This unilateral policy of setting the prevailing wage before the season has begun is closely related to the determination of need for alien contract labor. As observed earlier, foreign workers cannot be imported unless the Secretary of Labor certifies that a shortage of domestic labor exists. When the employers of a certain area meet before the season opens to set the prevailing wage, they usually agree on a rate lower than that which will actually be paid after the season gets underway. As a result of this low prevailing wage, few domestic workers are attracted to the area.<sup>17</sup> The employers then declare that a shortage of farm labor exists. And it does—at that low set price.

Another difficulty in ascertaining the need for foreign workers lies in the absence of any significant government regulation of domestic agricultural labor. Hired farm workers have few of the social protections that are commonly granted to industrial employees. They have no minimum wage standards (except in part in the Sugar Act), no unemployment insurance, no old age and survivors' insurance, and in most states no workmen's compensation insurance.<sup>18</sup>

The shortages of labor in agriculture do not only result from low wages and poor working conditions. They are also brought about by an ineffective use of the domestic labor force. That we are making poor use of our farm labor is made clear by a comparison of postwar employment practices with those of World War II. During the war years, the number of hired farm workers gradually declined until in 1945 approximately one half of a million workers were employed—almost a decrease of twenty percent of the 1940 employment figure.<sup>19</sup> With the decline

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 59-50. The Commission points out that "in the normal competitive market, prices, including the price of labor, are determined by the forces of supply and demand. Accordingly, if there is a shortage of labor, the price of labor should rise. Yet the opposite of this has actually occurred with wages of migratory farm workers. During the past four years of alleged 'labor shortages' in agriculture . . . farm wages in real and comparative terms have declined." (pp. 60-61).

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>18</sup>"Migratory Labor in American Agriculture," *Monthly Labor Review*, LXXII (June, 1951), p. 693.

<sup>19</sup>"Migratory Labor in American Agriculture," p. 27.

in the number of hired workers there was an increase in the production of agricultural goods. Greater production with fewer farm workers was accomplished through greater mechanization and by increasing the number of days employment of the workers. The farm families and hired domestic workers together averaged ten days more work at the height of the war emergency than they did in 1940.<sup>52</sup>

Since 1945, we have continued to use our farm labor force inefficiently. From 1945 to 1948, although our work requirements (total manhours) declined, we employed an ever increasing number of farm workers.<sup>53</sup> In other words, we have reduced the work contribution per worker by using more workers to do the same work. From 1946 to 1949, for example, the days of farm work per year for each farm worker dropped from one hundred thirteen to ninety.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, by providing more days work per year for our domestic farm workers, we could eliminate much of the labor shortage in agriculture, making the importation of alien contract labor unnecessary.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*

## The Evolution of Cuban Land Tenure and Its Relation to Certain Agro-Economic Problems

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Agrarian reform has been a pillar in the political platforms of nearly all aspiring Cuban leaders. During various periods in the island's history, attempts toward redistribution of land, diversification of agriculture and less island dependence on world markets, have achieved only partial success. The complexity and enormity of land tenure problems, permeate nearly every phase of Cuba's economic and social life. During the rise of the modern sugar industry, the concentration of landholdings, through a system of speculative, monopolistic landownership, was made possible by the feudal system of distributing property in the colonial era during Spanish rule. Many of the current problems of land taxation, vast size of properties and little land available for thousands of migrant wage-laborers, are traceable to the period when Cuba exported solely to Spain.

Basic to an intelligent approach toward solution of Cuba's complex agro-economic problems is an understanding of the evolution of land tenure. This paper presents a brief survey of the growth of vast holdings in Cuba, and some of the less-complex relationships between the island's leading agricultural activities and the land tenure system.

### *Colonial Forms of Land Tenure*

The economic and social matrix of the system of land monopoly in Cuba is found in the function of the colony within the Spanish Empire. The Crown's chief interest in the island was its value as a steady source of raw materials, and of easy revenue derived from land grants and concessions. Although Spanish colonists were pioneers, they were adventurers as well, interested in the accumulation of wealth as a source of prestige and power within the mercantilist structure of the empire. The policies and practices employed by Spain in distributing land graphically illustrate the difference between colonialization and colonization.

Land was distributed by means of *mercedes* or leased grants. The Captain General and the Royal Audience had the sole right to grant land. Scanty knowledge of local conditions, however, led to the practice of Cuban municipal governments granting crown lands, even though this practice was not sanctioned by law. From the beginning of settlement to the 18th Century, the following land classification was maintained on granted lands: *hatos*, or cattle lands; *corrales*, or hog-farm lands; *sitios* or *estancias*, lands for minor agriculture; and *solares*, or lands on which

to build homes.<sup>1</sup> The first two, *hatos* and *corrales*, were circular grants which had a selected center and a specified distance as radius. The former type of grant was the larger, having a radius of about two leagues, whereas the latter commonly had a one league radius. In contrast to the first two types, *sitios* and *solares* were square and much smaller in area.

Following early grants, another form of land tenure developed called *haciendas comuneras*, or communal lands. In theory, the circular form of the *merced* was a natural and suitable adjustment to the geographic and economic conditions of a little known island. The selection of the center of each *merced* was important, whereas the determination of boundaries was relatively unimportant. As the number of *mercedes* increased, overlapping boundaries were inevitable and existing land records became hopelessly involved. Controversies over ownership of lands adjacent to property boundaries commonly involved four or five families. Obviously, the subdivision of many landholdings, having indefinite boundaries and inaccurate location, was impossible. Since adequate means of settling disputes by law was lacking, heirs merely held title in common.

Owing to the circular form of land grants, it was impossible for municipal governments to distribute all the land within a given area. Thus, innumerable ungranted segments of land, relatively small in size, connected adjoining circular properties and remained as Crown lands. Often in legal embroilments among families holding land in common, the question of these small segments of land was broached because the overlapping boundaries of *mercedes* encroached on, or covered entirely such tracts. It is apparent that legal issues over title of ownership not only included claims of prospective heirs, but also, adjacent lands and ungranted Crown lands. The practice of maintaining property as collective holdings only deferred the complex problems that had to be solved before an individual secured a clear title of ownership.

The number of controversies over landownership in Cuba increased so rapidly that in 1819, the Spanish Government made an attempt to ease the situation by providing for voluntary division of estates. This measure failed because under Roman law during the colonial period, this method was costly and extremely slow. As a result of the failure of this measure, a large portion of Cuban land still was under communal ownership at the end of the Spanish American War.

The authenticity of *mercedes* granted to individuals by the municipal governments was questionable until the latter part of the 16th Century. As has been mentioned previously, the Captain General and the Royal Audience had the sole right to grant lands. Since times of early settle-

<sup>1</sup>H. E. Friedlaender, *Historica Economica de Cuba*, (Havana, Cuba) 1944, p. 55.

ment, however, municipalities had granted property with the tacit approval of the Royal Audience. The legal right of municipal governments to grant lands was verified by the *Ordenozas Municipales*, which were issued as a Royal Order in 1578. Therefore, before that date, those who held land granted as *mercedes* had unstable claim to it, whereas the identical system of granting property by municipalities from 1578 to 1729 was legal under Spanish law. As a result of this tardy legislation, court decisions were impossible on controversies over title if the lands in question involved a grant made prior to 1578 and one made after that date. Court and claims records became so confused that in 1729, a new Royal Order withdrew the right of municipalities to grant lands. The distribution of the small portion of remaining Crown land after 1729 was handled by Spanish "inspectors" under the surveillance of the mother country. Even today, Cuban courts have on record many land suits dating to this period that await judicial action. Thus, legal and legislative complications were added to the already complex problems arising from the inaccurate establishment of granted lands, and the inability of municipal governments to maintain adequate claims records.

The utter confusion resulting from the breakdown of the Spanish land system encouraged land monopoly by the wealthy, and aided unscrupulous landholders to increase their estates through property frauds. Since accurate location of granted lands was nearly impossible, it was exceedingly difficult to differentiate granted lands from state property. As a result, vast acreages in many of the island's provinces passed into private ownership without due process by law. A typical method of perpetrating land fraud, and which was utilized from 1879 to 1895 in the Province of Oriente, forms an excellent example of how state land passed into private hands. Individuals and corporations would induce local officials to assess a tax on the coveted state lands. This tax then would be paid to the Municipal Council for a period of years. On the basis of such tax payments, the appropriate judge was asked to give title of possession. Title received, the person or company committing the fraud would take it to the central government's tax collection agency, pay certain additional taxes and proceed to register state lands as his or their own without ever bidding for the property or making payment for the land.\*

Similar practices, varying only in the technique employed, occurred in many provinces of Cuba. During this period, cattle ranching, tobacco and sugar culture were becoming increasingly important activities. The weaknesses of the land system aided the development of vast cattle and sugar estates and affected greatly the island's tobacco industry.

\*Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs, *Problems of the New Cuba*, (New York: Foreign Policy Association Inc.) 1935, p. 51.

*Agricultural Problems Related to  
Landownership During the Colonial Period*

Tobacco culture and cattle ranching, important activities in Cuba today, also were important in the 16th and 17th Centuries. During the latter period, municipal governments granted lands for these agricultural enterprises, which were concentrated near the rivers Alemendares, situated near the city of Havana; Arimao, situated near the city of Trinidad; and Hanabamilla, situated near the city of Cienferego. The tobacco industry was under Crown monopoly and the government regulated all phases of crop production. Owing to Crown protection and increasing demand for leaf tobacco in Europe, the industry prospered and expanded greatly during the colonial period. Cuban cattlemen viewed with alarm the expansion of lands under cultivation and the rise in importance of tobacco cultivators in domestic affairs. In 1654, ranchers near Havana formed a petition aimed at curbing the expansion of tobacco plantations, claiming that the growth of plantations was interrupting cattle drives between pasture lands. The petition, however, never received judicial consideration. In 1659, the Trinidad Municipal Government submitted a similar petition from ranchers in that area to Governor Juan de Salamanca. He decided in favor of the tobacco planters, thus setting a precedent which dealt the cattlemen in Cuba a serious blow. Tobacco planters were given a concession which was analogous to "squatters rights" enjoyed by frontiersmen in the United States. This decree provided that if the planter tilled the land for 40 years without an intervening period of neglect, he could claim ownership of the land. Thus large tracts of land, long used by cattlemen for pasture but on which no clear title could be established, were homesteaded by expanding tobacco planters. In self defense, or from fear of agrarian expansion, cattlemen perpetrated land frauds in order to minimize the threat of crop cultivation to the ranching industry. The dispute between tobacco planters and ranchers died down owing to these decrees, only to be revived again when the expanding sugar industry aligned itself with the ranchers against tobacco cultivators in order to obtain large acreages needed for sugar culture.

Dating from 1763, sugar culture in Cuba progressed rapidly. Unlike the tobacco industry which was under the strict regulations of the Crown monopoly, sugar plantations expanded in areas where lands were not yet granted and on lands where claims records were in chaotic condition. In order to obtain power in the struggle among vested interests for larger and larger holdings, the sugar planters, in 1790, entered the dormant feud between tobacco men and ranchers. In the ensuing struggle, the combined strength of sugar planters and ranchers so hampered tobacco culture that many planters abandoned their lands, which reverted to the Crown. Gradually, tobacco production became con-

centrated in the present producing areas where climatic conditions, soils and drainage especially favor this crop.

#### *The Modern Sugar Industry and the Development of the Latifundio and Colono*

The Industrial Revolution in Europe and the United States profoundly altered the colonial sugar industry in Cuba. The influx of new technical skills and capital from abroad heralded the death of the old sugar mill in Cuba, which was an agro-industrial entity with its grinding capacity balanced with local supply. The rapid construction of the modern *central*, or mill, required more land devoted to sugar in order that production would meet greater plant capacity. Thus, the old system of communal lands underwent change because clear title of ownership was necessary if new mills were to obtain control of greater acreages. During the period of United States occupation, the American Military Government appointed a commission of Cuban lawyers to analyze existing problems of land tenure. Out of the findings of this commission came General Wood's order providing for division of communal estates by special court process. The successful establishment of private property for communal landownership laid the foundation for the corporate development of vast private estates or *latifundios*.

The meteoric rise in demand for sugar, coupled with the employment of free labor after slavery was abolished, encouraged the division of *latifundios* into smaller tracts (from 20 to 200 acres in size) in order that more intensive methods of production would be possible. These tracts are rented to tenant farmers, and are called *colonos*. There are about as many forms of *colonos* in Cuba as there are different forms of tenant-farm arrangements in the cotton producing sections of the United States. In every case, however, the contract between the sugar mill and *colono* provides for the grinding of the cane by the mill, which in turn, sets forth the terms of payment to the *colono*. Currently, the sugar industry in Cuba is organized on the *colono* system. More than 75 per cent of the crop is grown by tenant farmers; almost entirely however, on lands owned or controlled by the mills. The two main advantages of the *colono* system are: 1) capital need not be invested in full ownership of all lands by a mill; and 2) tenant farmers are paid according to current market prices for cane. The disadvantages are numerous and complex, but the main handicaps are: 1) the *colono* takes all the risk and may be ruined in a bad year; and 2) sugar contracts often require that all the land be devoted to cane. Such contracts aided the decline of types of farming other than cane, and helped to create the one-crop economy of the island, which is today, of serious national concern. In spite of governmental efforts since 1937, the establishments of diversified farming in Cuba has attained only partial success. Throughout much of the island, the land is admirably suited to sugar culture, and no other

agricultural activity is as remunerative as the production of cane in relation of cost to profit.

*The Problem of Vast Holdings Held in Reserve by Foreign Corporations and Cuban Landowners*

Approximately 75 per cent of the tillable land in Cuba is owned or under lease by a few sugar corporations and Cuban-owned cattle ranches. According to recent estimates, about 12,150,000 acres are controlled by 1,167 individuals or companies; 181 of which have interests in sugar and 799 in stock raising.<sup>8</sup> Nearly 62 per cent of the value of sugar properties is controlled by foreign capital. Invested capital from the United States is \$600,000,000, whereas that of Cuba, which ranks second, is \$200,000,-000. The Cuban American Sugar Company is reported to own six mills and approximately a million acres. The Cuba Cane Sugar Company operates 12 mills and owns 361,000 acres. The enormous areas controlled by the few assume proportions of substates within the provinces in which they are located. Vast sugar holdings, as well as large cattle estates, oppose diversification of agriculture and development of a domestic market in Cuba. In addition, the practice of large property holders keeping in idle reserve extensive portions of their holdings as protection against possible governmental agrarian reforms, reduces the productive potential of the island. Inasmuch as the present land tax system levies a very low tax on lands not in productive use, this practice of hoarding land reduces immeasurably needed government revenue.

Since the establishment of the sugar quota system and crop limitations by the Cuban Sugar Coordination Law of 1937, a relatively small portion of company-controlled lands have been utilized. Estimates reveal that *centrales*, or mills, could operate with about 40 per cent of the land they now control. In normal times, the companies always have kept about 3,300,000 acres of arable land as a potential reserve.

In much the same manner, large cattle ranches, which are numerous in the central and eastern portions of the island, control vast acreages that are little used in stock raising. Nearly 8,332,000 acres are used for grazing; only half this acreage is necessary for the needs incident to cattle raising. Frequently, prestige is a stronger motive than quick profits for hoarding land. Ownership of vast tracts still is considered a distinctive sign of class superiority. Thus, much of the land in the cattle regions of Cuba is only sporadically used, and is neither subject to demand for agricultural production nor contributes taxes to the government commensurate with their value.

Acreage in tobacco, a leading crop of Cuba, averages about 100,000, but has varied widely from this figure. Five different types of tobacco

<sup>8</sup>David Efron, George Soule and Norm T. Ness, *Latin America in the Future World*, (New York: Farrar and Rinehart Inc.) 1945, p. 82-3.

are cultivated in as many small areas in the central and western sections of the island. Individual farms in the tobacco areas are small owing to the tremendous amount of hand labor required in successfully producing high quality leaf. Wage-laborers in large numbers work in the fields during the planting and picking seasons. Population pressure on the land in the tobacco districts is intense. Successful subdivision of tracts, controlled by large landowners engaged in sugar culture or grazing industries, which are little used, would effectively lower the number of families that own no land. The tobacco industry, however, chiefly is concerned with stabilizing market prices altered by the recent conflict, and with substituting foreign markets lost owing to current world tension and rearmament induced austerity programs.

#### *The Problems of Antiquated Tax Laws In Relation to Land Hoarding*

Land hoarding in Cuba was encouraged by the absence of a rural real estate tax commensurate with the productive value of the soil. Currently, the burden of revenue is derived from taxes on basic consumer items and urban real estate. Actually, the present Cuban system of land taxation is but a slightly amended relic of the late 1800's. In 1895, 25 per cent of the rent on urban real estate was discounted, and on the remaining 75 per cent of the rent, the insular government imposed a 12 per cent tax. Country estates, on the other hand, were assessed on rental value at the low rate of 2 per cent. This tax applied only on those lands in which the municipal tax was below 10 per cent. Virtually the same method of taxation exists today. The powerful coalition of large landholders has thwarted all serious attempts to alter land tax laws in Cuba. As a result, the extensive unused acreages, which form parts of sugar and cattle empires, are a burden on the national government. At the request of the Cuban Government, the United States Treasury Department prepared a report on the land tax situation. In this report the following statement is made: "There appears to be little doubt that many properties are omitted from the municipal assessment rolls entirely, and that the efficiency and fairness of assessments varies widely in different parts of the island. Vacant, or unused property, urban or rural, should be subjected to some form of tax."<sup>4</sup>

#### *Conclusions*

It seems apparent that the existence of large landholdings in Cuba, insecure tenancy, and the significant class of landless farmers, is in part traceable to the feudal system of property allotment employed by Spain during the colonial era. Land reform necessarily will be slow owing to the complexity of land tenure problems. Redistribution of land is only

<sup>4</sup>Roswell Magill and Carl Shoup, *The Cuban Fiscal System*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.) 1939, p. 98.

one phase of a comprehensive program needed to create a highly productive and balanced agricultural economy. Capital must be made available to farmers at low rates of interest; markets cooperatively organized; better agricultural methods taught the people, and many other forms of socio-economic aid should be advanced. In the past 15 years, considerable progress has been achieved in diversification of agriculture.

Adjacent to urban agglomerations, many holdings are devoted to crops needed to sustain city dwellers. In various parts of the island, off-seasons specialty crops are grown, which enter the northern markets of the United States. The Constitution of Cuba adopted in 1940, contains specific sections designed for improvement of the island's agricultural economy by laying a basis for future legislation dealing with more paramount problems. For example, this document prohibits land monopoly and provides for subsequent legislation to fix the size of landholdings for each type of farm economy. Landownership by Cubans is upheld by provisions restricting holdings of foreigners, and making Cuban farms, valued up to 2,000 pesos, exempt from taxes. Notable progress also has been made in reducing the dominance of sugar and sugar-products in the island's list of exports. Products other than sugar, tobacco and cattle, which are traditional exports, account for nearly 20 per cent of the value of commodities sent abroad today.

Much remains to be done, but the trend toward a more varied agriculture indicates that Cuba is attempting to shake off the last vestiges of her colonial economy. The wealth of Cuba mainly lies in her tropical location and vast acreages of fertile land. Through technical improvements in crop production and careful planning, Cuba is attempting to reach a solution in which the plantation system—the mainstay of Cuba's economy—will be maintained at peak efficiency, while at the same time, the complex land tenure problems be resolved so that the majority of the people will receive directly a larger share of the island's wealth.

## A Comparison Between Dairying in Southeastern Wisconsin-Northeastern Illinois and Southwestern Puerto Rico

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### *Introduction*

The importance of dairy products as a food source is recognized everywhere. Until relatively recently, however, dairy products have been produced and consumed in large quantities only in certain parts of the mid-latitudes. Within the past twenty years dairying has expanded into areas that were formerly thought to be poorly suited for such an activity. This expansion of dairying into sub-marginal areas has met with varying degrees of success. One area, only recently a dairying region, which has had notable success in a seemingly hostile environment is southwestern Puerto Rico (Fig. 1).

The purpose of this study is to compare dairying in an environment which is generally considered hostile to dairying with an area which apparently has all the prerequisites for a successful dairy economy. More exactly, this study compares dairying in southwestern Puerto Rico with dairying in southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois (Fig. 2). In order to achieve this end it will be necessary to describe the environment of the two areas in question, characterize their respective dairy economies, and recount the differences and similarities in dairying within the two areas.<sup>1</sup>

### *Physical Environment of Southeastern Wisconsin And Northeastern Illinois*

Southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois is a gently rolling area, which was shaped largely by advancing and retreating lobes of the Wisconsin ice sheet. Irregular deposits of drift resulted in drumlins, moraines, and swamps. Kames, eskers, crevasse fills, and outwash plains are constant evidence of the activity of glacial melt water.

Soils which have developed on deposited glacial drift vary considerably in fertility depending on the physical and chemical characteristics of the drift and the degree to which it has weathered. Most of the soils are gray brown podzols, with soils of the Miami and Keweenaw series pre-

<sup>1</sup>Data have been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Material on southwestern Puerto Rico was gathered first hand during an intensive six month mapping and interviewing period in 1950. Material on Wisconsin dairying was gathered during a one month period of mapping and interviewing in Washington and Waukesha Counties in 1949. Information about dairying in northeastern Illinois was gathered during numerous reconnaissances in 1950-51. Secondary sources were consulted as well, and some of them are cited in other parts of the study.




Figure 1

dominating. Certain restricted areas have prairie soils, however, principally of the Clarion and Webster series.

As the soil types indicate, most of the area was originally covered by deciduous forest, primarily oak-hickory. Tall grass prairie occupied the area coincident with the zone of prairie soils.

The vegetation and soils are indicators of climatic type, since they have developed in partial response to it. Southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois is in the transition zone between Köppen Dfa (Humid continental-long summer) and Dfb (Humid continental-short summer). The entire area falls within Thornthwaite's BC'r (Humid microthermal).<sup>1</sup> Average annual precipitation decreases from about 33 inches in the south and east portion of the area to about 30 inches near the northern and western margin. Rainfall is fairly evenly distributed, although there is somewhat more precipitation in the warm half of the year.

Average warmest month temperatures range from 70°-73°F. January temperatures vary from 22°F. near the lake to 17°F. in the northwest portion of the area. Growing season in southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois varies from 170 days in the southern portion to 150

<sup>1</sup>For a good, brief explanation of the Thornthwaite and Köppen climatic classifications see: F. Kenneth Hare, "Climatic Classification," *London Essays in Geography*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 111-134.



Figure 2

days at the north. The climatic environment restricts certain agricultural activities, and this may explain, in part, the emphasis on dairying in this area.

#### *Physical Environment of Southwestern Puerto Rico*

Southwestern Puerto Rico is divided into three distinct physical subdivisions. The flat floored, low lying Lajas Valley occupies approximately the northern one-half of the area. South of the Lajas Valley, a zone of hills forms a low discontinuous range, which reaches a maximum elevation of 800 feet, but which has an average elevation of about 500 feet. The land south of the southern hills is occupied by the gently undulating south coastal plain.

These topographic features, geologic structure, and climate are the factors which have been largely responsible for the development of the various soil types of southwestern Puerto Rico. The soils of the Lajas Valley are alluvial and generally quite fertile. Soils on the flanks of the

hills and on the south coastal plain are reddish chestnuts and rendzinas of the Santa Isabel, Paso Seco, Soller, and Aguilera series. Much of the hilly area is composed of lithosols and shallow soils of the Descalabrado and Guayama series.

Southwestern Puerto Rican soils support vegetation which, for the most part, is xerophytic or semi-xerophytic. In areas where the water table is near the surface deciduous or semi-deciduous trees grow. Savanna-like grasslands with acacias associated in the park-savanna complex are frequently the climax vegetation in wetter areas, but vegetation in drier sections and excessively drained areas is truly xerophytic.

The xerophytic or semi-xerophytic vegetation and soil types are responses to an environment which is subhumid to semiarid. According to Köppen's classification the northern four-fifths of southwestern Puerto Rico is Aw (Tropical savanna) and the southern one-fifth is BSh (steppe). Applying Thornthwaite's classification it is found that the northern two-fifths is classified as CA'r (moist subhumid tropical), the central two-fifths as CA'd (dry subhumid tropical), and the southern one-fifth as DA'd (semiarid tropical). Precipitation varies from 50 inches at the northern boundary of southwestern Puerto Rico to less than 25 inches along the south coast. The precipitation thus varies more than 25 inches in a distance of about seven miles.

Seasonal rainfall distribution is even more important than total amount of precipitation in southwestern Puerto Rico, however, since most human activities are keyed to the rainfall regime. Most of the precipitation which falls on southwestern Puerto Rico comes in the period from May to early November. The period from November to May is almost rainless.

Precipitation effectiveness is reduced by the uniformly high temperatures prevailing in southwestern Puerto Rico. The average temperature in the warmest month, September, is about 83°F., while the coolest month, January, has an average temperature of 75°F. Temperatures are high enough for a year round growing season, but paucity of moisture in the winter months limits agricultural activities at that time.

#### *Dairying in Southeastern Wisconsin-Northeastern Illinois*

Dairying in southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois developed in response to a number of physical and cultural factors. From a physical standpoint the approach to dairying was probably negative rather than positive. The soils were generally not too fertile and the climate relatively severe; both factors which tend to limit agricultural activity. One of the natural responses to such an environment was to engage in agricultural activities which were complimentary to a dairy economy.

Culturally the people who settled in southeastern Wisconsin-northeastern Illinois took readily to dairying activities. The Yankees from New England, who came to the area early, and the Germans, Swiss, Swedes,

and Norwegians who came to the area in the middle and late nineteenth century readily adapted themselves to dairying activities.

Finally the large urban markets which developed in and around Chicago and Milwaukee required large supplies of dairy products. Proximate location of southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois to this market favored the establishment of a dairy economy. Dairying in this area has evolved from meager beginnings to its present considerable importance.

The dairy farms of southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois average slightly more than 100 acres in size,<sup>1</sup> and the average farm has about 18 milk cows. The predominant breed is Holstein, although most farms keep a few Jerseys or Guernseys to insure that the butterfat content of the milk will be maintained at acceptable levels. The average milk production is about 4 gallons per cow per day. Much of the milking in the area is done using mechanical milking machines. Milk is sent principally to Milwaukee and Chicago. Modern tank trucks and occasionally railroad cars move the milk to market. The farmer in southeastern Wisconsin-northeastern Illinois is presently getting about 9 cents per quart for his product.

May and June are the peak milk months, and January and February are generally the months when production reaches its lowest ebb. Lowered milk production in the winter months is usually due to a paucity of freshened cows at this time and a lack of green forage.

Supplemental feeding in the winter months explains the ever present silo. Few, if any, of the farms of southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois are without the tall, cylindrical silo. Substantial hay storage and milking barns are generally located adjacent to the silo to simplify feeding and animal care.

Ensilage which is stored in the silo is usually produced on the farm. Corn is the most prevalent ensilage, but in recent years a number of farmers have begun to put up alfalfa and other forage crops. Hay is usually produced and baled on the farm, although it is frequently necessary to purchase additional hay and grain for feeding in the winter months.

The majority of the farms have only relatively small acreages in pasture. The average figure for most farms is something less than 20 acres. Generally, too, these pastures are not permanent, but rather a part of the farmer's regular crop rotation scheme. The prevalent rotation in this area is pasture, hay, small grain, and corn. The remaining 80 acres of the average farm lies fallow or is planted to hay crops, corn, small grain, and occasionally, recently, a small acreage of a truck crop is included as well. Small woodlots, which serve as fence post sources and fuel,

<sup>1</sup>Information from interviews and Loyal Durand, "Dairy Barns of Southeastern Wisconsin," *Economic Geography*, XIX (1943), p. 41.

are present in most of the southeastern Wisconsin-northeastern Illinois dairy area.

As urban markets expand the dairying industry of southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois becomes more intensified. Continued expansion of dairying appears to be the future lot of this area.

#### *Dairying in Southwestern Puerto Rico*

Dairying in an environment such as that of southwestern Puerto Rico at first glance appears incongruous. Upon first inspection almost every factor of the environment appears unfavorable to dairying. Dairying has developed in spite of the environment, rather than because of it. Probably the chief reason for the development of a dairy economy in southwestern Puerto Rico has been an enlarging market for dairy products.

The people of Spanish extraction who live in southwestern Puerto Rico had little in their cultural background to suggest the development of a dairying economy. Outside the Lajas Valley, however, the physical environment strongly suggests the development of a pastoral activity of some sort. Dairying has been the response to this environmental suggestion.

Dairy farms of southwestern Puerto Rico are large. The average size is about 475 acres. One of the dairy farms comprises 6000 acres of land. Most of the larger farms resemble American beef cattle ranches, but the emphasis is on dairy rather than beef animals. The average number of cows per farm is 70, although one farm has more than 500. The predominant breed is a mixed native (zebu-creole) and Holstein. A strong second choice breed is mixed native-Brown Swiss. In southwestern Puerto Rico there is no butterfat premium, so the principal emphasis is on development of a breed which is disease-resistant and fairly productive in the southwestern Puerto Rican environment.

Milk production varies considerably within southwestern Puerto Rico, and the principal cause of the variation seems to be amount of precipitation. Along the northern margin of the area, where the precipitation is about 50 inches per year, the milk production per cow per day is about six quarts. Along the southern margin of the Lajas Valley where the precipitation is about 40 inches the milk production per cow per day is 4-5 quarts. South of the southern hills where the rainfall is 30 inches or less the milk production per cow per day is 2-3 quarts. Since the animals and facilities throughout southwestern Puerto Rico are comparable, the inference is that pasture quality is the principal factor favoring or inhibiting milk production in this area. Thus a five inch decrease in precipitation generally means a one quart per cow per day decrease in milk production.

Practically all the milk produced in southwestern Puerto Rico is sent to the city of Mayaguez for distribution as fluid milk, or for condensation

or drying in condensaries or dried milk plants. Milking is done by hand. All of the milk is collected by dairy trucks in five-gallon cans, and the farmers are paid about 7 or 8 cents per quart.

Peak milk production is attained in May and June when the cows have freshened and the grass of the pastures is again green and succulent after the spring rains of May. Dry pastures during the winter months are largely responsible for the period of slack milk production in December, January, and February.

The animals subsist almost entirely on pasture during the wet half of the year, and at many establishments must find their food on inadequate pastures throughout the year. Some of the more progressive dairy men have constructed underground silos for storage of supplemental dry season feed. The trend toward silo construction and supplementary dry season feeding is increasing. Dairy barns are only infrequently a part of the cultural landscape of southwestern Puerto Rico. They are universally open-sided, since protection from low temperatures is not a problem.

Corn and cane tops are the principal ensilage crops. Corn is usually produced on the farm and cane tops are usually hauled from farms in the Lajas Valley.

Corn and grain sorghum and other silage crops occupy only a small percentage of the total land area of farms. The overwhelming majority of individual landholding is in pasture. If an average unit of 475 acres is taken, 50 acres or less would be in crops, while the remainder would be in pasture or brush land. There is no regular crop rotation system.

Increasingly large acreages are being devoted to improved pasture. Grasses such as guinea grass (*Panicum Maximum*) are the dominant types planted to improve pasture carrying capacity. Large acreages have been in pasture land scores of years, in some instances for as long as 100 years or more.

These long-time pastures are partially responsible for the animal diseases that are a constant trial for the dairy man. Dipping is a regular bi-monthly price which every farmer must pay to assure freedom from ticks, and thus from Texas fever. High quality zebu bulls are frequently used to breed Texas fever resistance into the animals.

Other limitations imposed by the environment include lowered calf production, presumably because of the heat, fewer impregnations per bull service, and lowered vitality and shortened life of the bull. All of these factors add to the cost of production and reduce profits. None of these problems are encountered in a mid-latitude dairying area, such as southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois.

#### Summary

In general dairying in southwestern Puerto Rico is beset by more handicaps than dairying in southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern

Illinois. The physical environment of southwestern Puerto Rico is not as attractive for dairying as is the environment of southeastern Wisconsin-northeastern Illinois. Paucity of moisture in southwestern Puerto Rico reduces carrying capacities of pasture and limits the production of supplementary feed crops. Heat and aridity reduce the vigor and efficiency of animals in southwestern Puerto Rico. The shelter problem for animals in southwestern Puerto Rico is somewhat reduced, since the warm temperatures do not dictate snug barns.

The efficient, highly mechanized, compact unit exemplified by the dairy farm of southeastern Wisconsin and northeastern Illinois stands in sharp contrast to the rambling, relatively inefficient establishment of southwestern Puerto Rico.

In spite of the obvious superiority of mid-latitude dairying conditions, the dairy men of southwestern Puerto Rico have proven that dairying can be a successful and profitable venture in a tropical environment. Such a successful example may point the way to an eventual spread of dairying into tropical areas elsewhere.

## Book Reviews

*Edited by H. MALCOLM MACDONALD*

MORTON RUBIN: *Plantation County*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1951, Pp., 235, \$3.50.)

This, the first of several projected volumes describing Southern communities from the social anthropology approach, is, through culture-structure-function analysis, an interpretation of plantation society as exemplified by an Alabama county. The foreword by Professor Gillin emphasizes that the South is large, containing some common cultural bonds, but also exhibiting much diversity. This reviewer wishes to point out that the same limitation applies to those portions of the South known as "plantation areas." Tidewater and Low Country, Black Belt and Mississippi Bluffs, Delta and Red River Valley, the Louisiana Sugar Bowl—all are, or were, plantation areas; but in some of them, certain characteristics described by Dr. Rubin are inapplicable. There are reasons to consider the Black Belt the most representative "plantation area" in the South, but these reasons do not justify generalizations upon "plantation-area culture", which carry a region-wide implication. Use of the term "Black Belt culture", and a statement why the Black Belt was selected for study, would have removed this objection.

In his role as participant-observer, Dr. Rubin established rapport most easily and thoroughly with the upper and upper-middle classes of white society. Of the lower classes of the two races he has mainly hear-say knowledge, and therefore, may reflect the familiar stereotypes held by upper-level whites. In justice to the author, he explicitly acknowledges this doubtless unavoidable limitation. For this same reason, his material contains a great deal that has elsewhere been thoroughly described. His material upon child-training practices, for example, differs significantly from other accounts of middle-class American patterns only in respect to the influence of the biracial situation upon socialization.

One feels that Dr. Rubin, to an unusual degree, became part of the community where he worked. His description enables the reader to see the community more vividly than have most comparable ones; in this respect, Plantation County joins Plainville. He clearly demonstrates that Plantation County exemplifies a dynamic cultural situation (with the traditional themes—master of the land, conformity to the word of God, and an "ideal" social stratification—being impinged upon by the values of mass society). The partial blending of the agrarian upper class with a newer business-industrial group, and the partial transfer of plantation traditions to new enterprises—processes familiar throughout much of the South—are handled well. Especially good are the descriptions of various plantations. These range from the plantation unable to adjust to the

demands of present-day operation, and thus doomed to failure, to the plantation very like a western cattle ranch, with intermediate types representing the more usual forms. The sharp differentiation of sex roles with implications upon the adaptability of the system; the power structure of the county; race-caste past and present; changing institutional patterns; population changes; the role of federal and state policies; these and other aspects of life in Plantation County are clearly and meaningfully presented.

Oklahoma A. & M. College

Joseph S. Vandiver

MERRILL JENSEN, (Ed.): *Regionalism in America*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951, Pp., 425, \$6.50.)

Both the youth and the maturity of the regional way of looking at social phenomena are characteristics of this volume. Youth is evidenced by the vagueness and diversity of the concepts of regionalism and of the region; maturity in the variety of approaches used and the diversity of the subjects discussed from this one point of view. Maturity is further expressed in the common conviction that regionalism enables the scholar to order his data in a meaningful manner—a conviction that is shared even by the one scholar who seeks to deflate the regional approach.

The volume opens with a long and leisurely history of the development of the idea of the section, mostly by geographers and historians, written by Fulmer Mood of the University of Texas; and a shorter account of the more recent use of the concept and the differentiation of the region from the section by Vernon Carstensen, of the University of Wisconsin. Mood acutely points out that only after working with specific regional-sectional groupings of states did American scholars arrive at the concept of the region as an abstraction. Both men pay due respect to Frederick Jackson Turner; and together they reproduce a letter written by Turner four years before his death in which that historian makes a distinction between "region" and "section."

The South, the Spanish Southwest and the Pacific Northwest are the subjects of three essays, by Francis Butler Simkins, of Louisiana State; John W. Caughey, of the *Pacific Historical Review*, and Lancaster Pollard, of the Oregon Historical Society, as examples of social regions. Here it is interesting to note that the South is assumed to be an entity which needs no definition; that the Pacific Northwest is seen in terms of "kinship area"; while the Spanish Southwest is portrayed as a vague entity which defies definition because, according to Gauhey, Southwest-erners do not identify with their region. One wonders if this would have been the conclusion of a non-historian and a non-Californian.

Literature, painting, architecture and linguistics are discussed as regional expressions by John Fabian Keinitz, of the University of Wisconsin; Benjamin T. Spencer, of Ohio Wesleyan; Rexford Newcomb, of

the University of Michigan. Gordon R. Clapp discusses TVA; Walter A. Rowlands, the Great Lakes Cutover Region; and Elmer Starch, the Missouri Valley-Great Plains area. In each case the regional concept is shown as it has worked out into an action program.

The more theoretical portion of the volume consists of an essay on the regional concept as a research tool, by Rupert B. Vance; one on the limitations of regionalism, by Louis Wirth; and "The Promise of Regionalism" by Howard W. Odum. Vance offers the interesting hypothesis that the natural history of an area may pass from the pioneer stage into sectionalism and then into regionalism as it matures and establishes stable relations with other regions. Wirth seems unable to get away from the older idea of geographic determinism and never to see the region as a stage for dynamic social action; though he does see the concept of the region as a fruitful hypothesis and regionalism as an active, promising movement in social thought. Odum is much more optimistic that regionalism will promote both better social theory and better social integration, though he is quick to resent the implication that regionalism is a cult.

It is noteworthy that the participants in this symposium represent all portions of the nation, indicating that the movement is not restricted to any one region. Sumner Welles insisted that regional organization held the only feasible promise of world peace. Justice Felix Frankfurter restricts his vision to this nation, but seems to have much the same idea in mind when he writes, in a foreword: ". . . the concern underlying all these essays is how a country that is a continent can be governed by organs that fairly represent its disciplined will and at the same time adequately evoke the diverse civilized potentialities of its people . . . At bottom, the problems of American regionalism are the problems of American Civilization, the continuous process of bringing to fruition the best of which American men and women are capable." One wonders if the learned jurist would be willing to substitute the image of the world for that of the nation.

The University of Texas

Harry Estill Moore

CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.: *The Legal Status of the Tenant Farmer in the Southeast.* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1952, Pp., 478, \$7.50.)

The correlation of science and law is more talked of than accomplished, more an ideal than a realization. A worthwhile project for that realization is *The Legal Status of the Tenant Farmer in the Southeast*, which follows the same plan as an earlier volume designed to correlate legal and social fields in relation to the Negro.

The author has covered the legal aspects of farm tenancy in thirteen of the Southeastern states by digesting and discussing a large volume of

judicial opinions to cover a wide range of topics with commendable emphasis on the financial arrangements incident to farm tenancy. Economic and sociological data from sources other than judicial opinions are confined almost exclusively to the final chapter in which the author offers his suggestions for reforms to be accomplished primarily by state legislative programs. Chapter conclusions, both on the present state of the law and as recommendations, are set forth throughout the book. Thus, the reader is advised that "(i)f one presupposes a just administration of the law," the legal remedies for the protection of the "cropper" seem adequate to prevent the "machinations of unscrupulous landlords" and that "all that is needed is a program to teach the cropper how to use them." To those interested in social and economic problems of agriculture, this book should be primarily useful as a reference covering particular legal problems of farm tenancy.

Practicing attorneys and legal scholars will find a valuable cyclopedic listing of cases, marred, however, by conceptual analysis; by the absence of detailed, critical comparisons for the purpose of distinguishing case holdings; and by the omission of current practices of landlords, tenants, and marketing and financing agencies. Noticeable is the treatment of the distinction between "tenant" and "cropper" which is reminiscent of controversies over "title" in its failure to identify factually the parties, their problems, their claims and the results in the separate cases.

Although the author's analysis is directed primarily to the legal structure of the landlord-tenant relationship, it appears clear that no satisfactory alternative has yet been offered for adequate size and production-volume of the farm unit, whether owned or leased by the farm family.

The University of Texas

Keith E. Morrison

FRANCIS E. MERRILL and H. WENTWORTH ELDREDGE: *Culture and Society*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952, Pp., 611, \$5.50.)

This is a thoughtful, interesting text. Its six major sections deal with culture and society; social structure and personality; population, race and social structure; collective behavior; the community and social institutions; and social interaction, social change and social planning.

The last-named section signalizes its major departure from other texts: the authors stress social action as a natural accompaniment to the description and analysis of social phenomena. "He (the social engineer) is the civil engineer of society, who uses the findings of the 'pure' scientist of culture and society" (p. 346). Thus they take the side of "Knowledge for What" in one of our great current debates. They do not demonstrate, however, the link between social science and social action, except in such near-technological areas as the TVA, traffic congestion, water supply, etc. The TVA is an excellent example of technological planning, but that the Authority was not planned from the "pure" point of view of

*social organization* has been shown by Selznick; this is the kind of gulf the authors fail to bridge. Although they devote most of the book to such subjects as culture, socialization, the social self, status and role, stratification and so on, these truly social and cultural phenomena do not become "applied".

It is perhaps true that much "pure" social and cultural theory is too abstract to be translated directly into social action, and that there may be intervening levels of theory from which social engineers can draw their lead. Yet one can think of work which has made use of theory, especially in the areas of attitude change and race and community relations. Although the authors present meaty discussion of the relation between the dynamics of the social self and social control on the institutional level, for instance, they do not attempt to relate this frame of reference to possible action.

Subsequent texts will doubtless follow this approach; therefore much attention needs be given the possible effects of it on the student. He is told he can do social engineering; then what follows? Technological planning, well and good. With social planning, however, it is well known that the techniques of inducing change involve great complexities, many sets of conditions embracing social, cultural, psychological and power considerations. The pitfalls of unplanned and unforeseen consequences invite much caution. Finally, it will be interesting to get the reactions from those who select the book as a text: what problems confront the teacher using a social engineering approach?

Newcomb College, Tulane University

Warren Breed

MURIEL H. WRIGHT: *A Guide to the Indian Tribes of Oklahoma.*  
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951, Pp., 300, \$5.00.)

This book has been needed for a long time. Although one-third of the Indians of the United States live in Oklahoma, until now it has been difficult for one to find out just which tribal groups are still represented there and where they are located. Miss Wright's book is more than a guide to these groups; it is a small encyclopedia, an indispensable reference volume for anyone who seeks miscellaneous factual data regarding Oklahoma's Indian population.

Sixty-seven tribal groups are covered, although only twenty-nine still retain their ethnic identity in Oklahoma today. These groups are arranged alphabetically, and the material on each is organized under the following topical headings: Name, Present Location, Numbers, History, Government and Organization, Contemporary Life and Culture, Ceremonials and Public Dances, and Suggested Readings. History always receives the fullest treatment, and the most disappointing section is invariably Contemporary Life and Culture, which is given only superficial

treatment. It is evident that Miss Wright's interests are primarily historical.

The space allotted to each tribe appears to be based on its importance in the history of Oklahoma. Slightly less than a third of the book is devoted to the "Five Civilized Tribes"—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole. The volume includes 128 illustrations, far too many of which are portraits of Indian leaders. Fifteen or twenty documentary pictures illustrating contemporary Indian community life in Oklahoma would have added much to the book's value and interest. A rather full bibliography is included, as well as five maps showing reservation boundaries and important Indian settlements at various times since 1837.

The University of Texas

T. N. Campbell

T. L. JARMAN: *Landmarks in the History of Education: English Education as part of the European Tradition.* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., 323, \$4.75.)

This rather brief volume attempts and achieves two purposes: it describes the mainstreams in the history of education in western Europe and it marks out, in somewhat more detail, the story of the evolution of English education. Its general organization is traditional. The first third of the book is composed of short sections on ancient and medieval educational history. The remainder is devoted to the modern period. Approximately half of the book is concerned with England, separate chapters being provided on English medieval schools, Tudor and Stuart schoolboys, the revival of the English public schools, and nineteenth century schoolboys. Two full chapters and most of another treat of the building of a national school system in England.

The author's philosophic position is frequently in evidence. He appears to view the English "public school" as the embodiment of true education. In fact, he suggests that we err in applying the term *education* indiscriminately to the English primary and modern secondary schools and to the American high school on the one hand, and on the other to the grammar schools and English public schools. And though he does not say so expressly, he nevertheless implies a belief in the propriety of the age-old social and economic distinctions between teachers of young children and teachers of adolescents; he notes that "It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the same word teacher is used in each case, and that primary and secondary teachers are now paid the same basic salary."

Philosophy aside, however, the book is well done. Its style is lucid, its words well-chosen. The high points of the development of education in England are nicely integrated with related events on the continent, and the author rightly did not feel constrained to explore every nook and cranny of educational history in order to achieve his goal. Descriptions of the education of outstanding persons serve to enliven the narrative.

Except for the section on general surveys, the bibliography is good. The entire book is worth attention as a survey of the main features of the educational history of western Europe, though the sections on education in England will be most useful to the American reader.

University of Colorado

Edwin R. Carr

WILLIAM C. BINKLEY: *The Texas Revolution*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952, Pp., 132, \$2.50.)

When an able scholar devotes a quarter of a century of research to a subject and when that subject is one of the most interesting and momentous revolutionary movements of modern times the result, when presented in a formal essay, should be a significant contribution to historical literature. The volume under review is in no way disappointing to such an expectation. Professor Binkley is a well-known authority who has devoted more than twenty-five years to a study of Anglo-American activities in Texas. In recognition of his achievements, Louisiana State University invited him to deliver the Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History. The work under review presents the four lectures in book form. Professor Binkley's study maintains the high level of scholarship of the Fleming lectures of the past.

The author does not pretend to tell in so short a space the complete or the definitive story of the Texas Revolution. The volume is an interpretative study, not a detailed factual account. Beginning with a chapter describing conditions in Texas on the eve of the Revolution, Professor Binkley carries the reader through an amazing story of suspicions, misunderstandings, jealousies, confused aims and conflict of purposes. There was, of course, the basic question of a conflict between two national groups with vastly different backgrounds. There was, too, jealousy, misunderstanding and conflict between Texans themselves—civilians against civilians, military men against military men, and civilians against armed forces. For instance, although the armed conflict began in October, 1835, it was not until April of 1836 that the army and the civil authorities were in accord on the purpose of the struggle.

Despite the confusion of the times, Professor Binkley makes clear the issues and the changing purposes of the Texas Revolution.

Baylor University

Jefferson Davis Bragg

ROBERT C. COTNER (Ed.): *Addresses and State Papers of James Stephen Hogg*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1951, Pp., 579, \$6.00.)

It is fortunate that the centennial of Hogg's birth should occasion the release in 1952 of a publication containing the rotund phraseology and far-sighted political wisdom of the most influential name in Texas history outside Stephen F. Austin and Sam Houston. As E. C. Barker notes in

his Foreword to the edition, Hogg dominated political life in Texas from 1890 to 1895 and remained a major force in public affairs until his death in 1906. His forcefully and forthrightly expressed views on matters of public interest rightly place him in the front ranks of the Texas democracy and there his own words sound clear with the familiar ring of the great American tradition stemming from the ideology of the Declaration of Independence. That is not, of course, the only American tradition, but it is the one in which, probably, most Americans have taken the greatest pride and in which the overtones of an "American truth" are recognized.

In 1888, on being nominated Attorney General for Texas, Hogg declared:

On the one extreme stands an organized class whose purpose seems to be to remodel society by regulating property upon new theories . . . On the other, is to be seen a federation of voracious individuals . . . without respect to the common welfare of society at all. The first has for its chief weapon the terror of force . . . The second holds within its grasp the power of wealth . . . and exerts it in that vicious spirit which blinds the glutton to the wails of the hungry crowd around him . . .

Hogg continued in 1890:

Public highways used to be nothing more or less than wagon roads, open to all who wished to travel over them . . . So long as they were on earth . . . but little or no question was raised as to the right of the government to control . . . them, but since they have become laid with wooden ties and steel rails . . . and controlled by millionaires . . . they are defiant of law and revolt at public control . . . They are now called private enterprises.

It is no wonder that in 1890 Hogg should have wittily written the Editor of the *Dallas News*:

. . . I was somewhat at a loss to know why I should be so misunderstood . . . Since . . . leisure has permitted me to more carefully look over your paper . . . I . . . believe I have discovered the cause. Its leading editorials often insinuate . . . that the doctrines that I advocate are "communistic" . . . I regret that any paper . . . would sound such false alarms, and must abide its pleasure in correcting them.

Hogg went on to fight against monopoly, unrestrained corporations, rule by federal court injunction, federal army intervention to break strikes, protective tariffs, the gold standard, American imperialism, lynch law and mob violence, lobbyists, and other pernicious forces, as he saw them, in Texas and the United States. Near the end of his life, Hogg declared, "Let us have Texas, the Empire State, governed by the people; not Texas, the truckpatch, ruled by corporate lobbyists."

Hogg's papers and speeches are stimulating and valid Texana and Americana, a heritage worth recalling, placing the stamp of authenticity on the encomium, "The People's Governor."

Texas Christian University

Merrill Rippy

WILLIAM DOSITE POSTELL: *The Health of Slaves on Southern Plantations.*  
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951, Pp., 231, \$3.00.)

This monograph rescues another aspect of the nation's ante bellum chattel system from the realm of prejudice and misinformation. Significant conclusions, some the result of statistical analysis, await the reader: (1) The health of slaves was no better and no worse than the public health of that period. (2) The medical care and treatment provided slaves was, in most cases, of the highest quality known to the then infant science of medicine. Both planter and slave usually received identical treatment for the same disease or injury. (3) Medical failures in the care and treatment of slaves were the failures of the time and were by no means unique to the slave system. (4) Slave owners were vigilant and solicitous of the health of their human property due to economic and humanitarian motives.

The author opens his study with a summary chapter on the state of public health existing at the time in the South. This is followed by a survey (the ablest known to this reviewer) of the slavery and plantation system of the same area. Then various phases of plantation management relating to the health of slaves are considered in detail. Representative topics treated are the efforts to administer to the slaves' physical needs, the means employed in caring for and treating the ill and descriptions of the various injuries and diseases. The concluding chapter is an analysis and evaluation of the data used in preparing this study by comparing the data with the actual results obtained in caring for the slaves. Results were measured in terms of birth rates, death rates, infant mortality rates, morbidity rates and physical impairments.

The bibliography lists an imposing array of manuscript sources such as planters' letters, journals and account books. The footnotes—in this case, endnotes—indicate more effectively than the bibliography the unusual extent to which the author utilized manuscript materials. Contemporary printed matter was also used extensively as well as masses of noncontemporary titles. Taking a subject unusually difficult to interpret and generalize, the author demonstrates a high degree of skill in coping with this problem. Moreover, the interpretations and generalizations are more extensive and more convincing than those found in most monographs. This study will not need to be redone.

Oklahoma A. and M. College

LeRoy H. Fischer

J. A. CORRY: *Elements of Democratic Government.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, Pp., 644, \$4.50.)

This book was originally written at the end of World War II with a view to its use by Canadian students, and was published in 1946 under the title, *Democratic Government and Politics*. In 1947, a revised and

enlarged edition was published under the present title, and its success has led to the present revision. The bulk of the book is taken up with an elementary description and comparison of the structure and working of the government in the United States and Great Britain. Their relation to the basic activating ideals is discussed, and numerous instances, where effective contrast seems possible, the relevant institutions of the Soviet Union are sketched and their relation to basic communist theory is noted. In this way, an effort is made to contrast liberal democratic theory and practice with the theory and practice of Communist dictatorship as represented by the Soviet Union. This approach makes the volume quite a valuable text for the courses in "Comparative Government" which limit their treatment to these countries only. The author acknowledges that "international politics . . . is a distinct and separate subject of study", but has included a chapter on this field here. But above all, the treatment is built on the premise that liberal democracy is the best system of government. In this respect, the author is prone to disregard the weaknesses of contemporary liberalism, as well as the fact that liberal democracy could never flourish in such countries as Russia, as the whole historical background has never favored it. But in this world of competing ideologies, it is probably just as well that we are so ably reminded of the values offered to us by democratic ideals and democratic institutions.

University of Bridgeport

Joseph S. Rousek

PAUL H. APPLEBY: *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952, Pp. 261, \$4.00.)

For the third time Dean Appleby has written a book around a series of lectures, in this case the Edward Douglass White Lectures, delivered at Louisiana State University. No doubt the word "morality" occurs in the title as a reflection of widely-publicized exposures of dishonesty in public service, but pecuniary morality is not the subject of the book. Graft, bribery, venality, are discussed, to be sure, but Dean Appleby's subject is no less than the moral foundation of democratic government, and the substance and mechanics of moral conduct in the democratic administration of the peoples' affairs. In the perspective of the book, financial dishonesty is but one of a number of forms of immoral conduct, some intrinsically, or at least presently, of greater importance to our national life. The implications for administrative morality of McCarthyism, pressure politics, constitutional principles and practices, personal conduct toward administrative colleagues—such matters as these engage the author's attention.

The premises of the book are well stated: "Any attempted study of public administration which would exclude illumination of such administration as at once pursuing and deeply involved in values would be much

less than a study of public administration. This is peculiarly and especially true when the study is directed at administration in democratic government."

"Similarly, any course in American government or any general formulation of American political theory which fails to comprehend and integrate into it the general administrative process (not merely the much less extensive legalistic process) deals with much less than the putative subject."

With these statements the reviewer agrees completely. And as customary the author says much that is penetrating and wise; Dean Appleby has done as much as any person to bring about the wedding of administrative study and political theory. The reviewer offers two criticism, however, one of style and one of substance.

The reviewer found the book difficult to read. Some of the reasons for this are noted by the author in his preface: the "mixture" of hearers and readers, and the difficulty of presenting in brief compass a treatment of "wide-ranging action related to some of the profoundest problems of social concern." Whatever the reasons, the eminent readability of *Big Democracy* is absent.

The substantive criticism is that Dean Appleby places a too high estimate on the superior morality of hierarchy and high officialdom; on The Beneficent Hierarchy and The Omniscient Top Administrator. It is reasonable to presume that this eagle's-eye perspective of the administrative world results from Dean Appleby's long experience near the top of the hierarchy; and that the reviewer's rabbit-eye objections follow from his long experience in the bottom echelons.

University of California

Dwight Waldo

JOHN A. DAVIS: *Regional Organization of the Social Security Administration—A Case Study*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp., 315, \$4.00.)

This book provides an analysis of a very significant administrative development. The Social Security Board and its successor, the Social Security Administration, were pioneers in the administration of several programs through a single set of regional offices. The experience is the more notable because the organization units to be coordinated in such offices were field extensions both of program units and functional units of the Washington office, and because the plan called for coordination of these two types of units under a regional director. Here was an experiment in "multi-program, functionalized regional organization under general regional command." The experience laid the background for the larger effort of the Social Security Agency involved in the transfer of the field functions of its other constituent units to the regional offices developed for the Social Security Administration. The pioneer

experience must also have influence whenever other agencies decide to use one set of offices for administration of several programs.

Mr. Davis has analyzed with considerable skill the efforts of the Social Security Administration and its predecessor from 1935 to 1947 to solve the many complicated problems in field administration. He deals adequately with problems relating to location of offices, lines of supervision, communication and control, and scope of authority of the regional director. He shows the conflict of opinions and the groping forward in the search for solutions.

Davis' able analysis is a valuable addition to the very limited literature on field administration. Beyond this, Davis argues throughout the volume for the concept of dual supervision and for precise definition of the general but limited function of the regional director. He provides a more complete theoretical underpinning for these ideas than exists elsewhere, and finds substantiation for them in the analyses by skilled administrators within the social security organization.

By now this argument almost has the ring of orthodoxy. Nevertheless, some believe that the influence of the notion of dual supervision has been too strong and that the crucial problem in multi-program administration is to enlarge the power of the "general regional command." Davis quite realistically recognizes the limitations on control of technical matters by a regional director, but he may underestimate the scope of authority which can and should be exercised by such an official.

The University of Texas

Emmette S. Redford

RAYMOND F. MIKESELL: *United States Economic Policy and International Relations.* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, Pp., 341, \$3.75.)

The new book of Professor Mikesell on the United States Foreign Economic Policy is a welcome addition to the field. Professor Mikesell has long been one of our recognized authorities in the field of International Economics, and his many contributions in various journals are always studied attentively.

In his present volume, he incorporates his vast first-hand knowledge of foreign economic policies in a broader framework, which deals with a problem not in the usual piecemeal fashion, or as a chronological catch-all. He rather attempts to group our numerous policy measures under a series of logical headings, showing the development of our current policy since the first World War and the change-over of the thinking of our policy makers during this period.

His contribution is extremely valuable, not only because he writes with lucid prose, but he emphasizes the high points of our policies. While every point is thoroughly documented, his use of references is very selective, and he refers only to significant original documents, or more

important statements of opinion. On the other hand, in its selection of topics, the book is as complete as could be desired. It deals with equal mastery with monetary and commercial problems and is remarkably free of personal bias or the advocacy of the author's pet theories. One may disagree with some of his conclusions, even though they are based throughout on strong evidence and sober judgment.

We cannot quite agree with the author that the international trade organization is as vital to the goal of our present policy as he seems to indicate.

"Unless there is an international organization which administers rules in the commercial-policy field which are parallel with the regulations of the Monetary Fund in the field of foreign-exchange practices, little progress can be made by the Fund in promoting liberal exchange practices."

This statement and other similar views on our commercial policy remain a matter of individual judgment, but they deduct nothing from the essential value of this book.

It is not possible to summarize the long list of important problems he deals with, and we must strongly recommend the book to all of those who are interested to find out what really happened in the field of foreign economic policy. The book should be on the must list for every graduate student in Economics, as well as those in International Affairs.  
Oklahoma A. and M. College

R. W. Trenton

MICHAEL MARTIN and LEONARD GELDER: *The New Dictionary of American History*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., 695, \$10.00.)

This handy reference consists of some 4,000 entries, alphabetically arranged, dealing with various aspects of American history. The reader can easily find concise, exact information on a name, place, event, or even a catch phrase. The coverage is remarkably comprehensive for a one volume work. In addition to the usual political, military, and geographical data, information is also given on religion, science, art, education, labor, industry, and many other aspects of American life, both past and present.

The volume fills a definite need for the teacher, student, and laymen, and should have wide acceptance.

Tarleton State College

Dick Smith

E. SYLVIA PANKHURST: *Ex-Italian Somaliland—How It Was Acquired, How It Was Ruled, Its Future*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, Pp., 460, \$7.50.)

Miss Pankhurst belongs to the famous family which, among other things, took a leading part in the Suffragette Movement in Britain more

than a generation ago. In the middle thirties she espoused the cause of the Ethiopians and of other peoples who had become the object of Fascist aggression. The organ of the group around Miss Pankhurst was, and still is, the *New Times and Ethiopia News*, of which she is the editor. The liberation of Ethiopia in 1941 by no means deprived this group of its *raison d'être*, for there still remained the problems of getting rid of the British Military Administration in Southeast Ethiopia (the so-called "Reserved Area") as well as in the adjacent Italian possessions, Eritrea and Somalia, and of effecting the "reunion" of the latter two with Ethiopia. To further these objectives there was created an International Ethiopian Council for Study and Report, of which Miss Pankhurst is Secretary. With the recent establishment of a federal union between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the chief unfulfilled aspiration in the Pankhurst program is the attainment of independence for Somalia as promised by the United Nations after the conclusion of the ten-year period of Italian trust administration in 1960 and the eventual union of all the Somali peoples, presumably in some sort of a loose constitutional association with Ethiopia. The present work serves to give the historical, legal and moral justification for this hope.

So much for the author's background and the general animus motivating her approach to the subject. Her work unhappily shows more zeal than scholarship, more indignation than clear thinking. The fact nevertheless remains that this book is of real importance, if for no other reason than because of the complete dearth of comprehensive treatises on Somaliland in English. Miss Pankhurst has traced the history of Somalia from the beginnings of Italian penetration there in the closing years of the last century down to the reimposition of Italian rule under United Nations auspices in 1950. To bolster her narrative she has quoted liberally from documents and other source material, often without any footnote references. In general, she may be said not to have followed many of the elementary canons of historical criticism in reconstructing the story she has to tell. Indeed, the reader is left with the exasperating feeling that the author's carelessness and her biased point of view—however much one may respect her humanitarian instincts—have left the subject in such a state that it will have to be thoroughly reexplored and reinterpreted before the results are acceptable to scholars.

University of Denver

Robert Gale Woolbert

PAUL STUDENSKI and HERMAN E. KROOS: *Financial History of the United States*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, Pp. 528, \$6.50.)

The text book character of the volume reviewed is evident upon the most cursory examination. Are traditional brands, such as black type paragraph headings breaking almost every page really an essential charac-

teristic of a book which may be used as a text? May not students share with this reviewer a negative reaction to the suggestion that the volume might be good reading?

For the authors have produced a better than average product as to readability and interest.

Following a frankly stated thesis that "we not only can, but do learn from past experience," the authors have placed events, policies and actions in contemporary settings, and suggested their ramifications. Judgments of what we can learn in specific instances are often implied if not clearly stated. The reader may not agree to the lesson, but he is not likely to overlook it.

Citing of statements by contemporary observers injects, intentionally or unintentionally, sly humor into the record. The purported remark of a commissioner of pensions, "God help the surplus", suggests that deficits are not the only problem of government budgeting. The query of Speaker Reed to the economy minded of the nineties, "Isn't this a billion dollar country?" has its points. Statements by the American Banker's Association, upon the adoption of the Federal Reserve Act, that it was hard to accept for "those who do not believe in socialism," is set against the optimistic utterance of the Comptroller of the Currency that under this law, ". . . financial and commercial crises or panics seem to be mathematically impossible."

A check of chapter headings with those of the early standard text by Davis Dewey, first published in 1904, reveals significant shifts of emphasis. "Tariff," which appears in the title of four chapters in the earlier book, is in the title of none in the present volume. There are three chapters of the textbook under review devoted to "State and Local Finance," not mentioned as a title in Dewey's book. Omission from chapter headings indicates, not neglect, but a shift of interest on the part of students as well as of popular discussants.

A fortuitous feature of the book is up-to-dateness. The closing sections deal with the 1950 budget. Summary tables for periods are clearly presented. Bibliographical lists are well organized and items which the authors consider most helpful are starred.

It should be evident that, in the opinion of the reviewer, the book should not be ignored by anyone who is interested in a textbook in the financial history of the United States.

The University of Texas

Ruth A. Allen

National Committee on Governmental Accounting: *Municipal Accounting and Auditing*. (Chicago: Municipal Finance Officers Association of the United States and Canada, 1951, Pp., 250, \$4.00.)

In the late 1930's and early 1940's the National Committee on Municipal Accounting actively developed standard accounting principles and

procedures as applicable to municipalities and other local units of government. These principles, designed to provide a national standard in the field of municipal accounting, were incorporated into several small volumes and published under the auspices of the Municipal Finance Officers Association of the United States and Canada. The entire group of publications received wide acceptance, and their impact is reflected in the accounting systems of many American municipalities today.

Four of these publications have been revised and combined into the volume *Municipal Accounting and Auditing* by the National Committee on Governmental Accounting, successor to the National Committee on Municipal Accounting. The four are: *Municipal Accounting Statements*, *Municipal Funds and their Balance Sheets*, *Municipal Accounting Terminology*, and *Municipal Audit Procedure*. The principal task of fusing these earlier works into the present volume fell upon Irving Tenner, nationally-known authority in the field, who as the National Committee's consultant prepared the initial and final drafts for publication. At intermediate points in the preparation of the present volume, members of the National Committee on Governmental Accounting and appropriate subcommittees reviewed the document and made suggestions for its improvement. The result is a concise publication which reflects the combined thoughts of academicians, accounting practitioners, finance officers, and municipal administrators in the United States and Canada.

There are four basic divisions in this the latest work of the National Committee on Governmental Accounting. The first, which is brief, is a summation of the principles of municipal accounting; the second, which comprises the bulk of the volume, is a detailed discussion of funds and illustrates financial statements and statistical tables required for adequate financial reports. The third portion of the book is devoted to municipal audit procedure and the last section covers terminology in the field of municipal accounting. Although these sections resemble closely their individual predecessors, it must be emphasized that the new volume is more than a mere reprint of work formerly done. Significant changes in content have been made. Principles have been revised in several instances; old financial statements have been altered and new ones recommended; new statistical tables have been developed; and, specific terms employed in municipal accounting have been clarified and redefined in several instances.

All in all, the standards promulgated in this volume tend to be more realistic in terms of present day accounting needs and thusly the book becomes a welcome addition to literature in the field. *Municipal Accounting and Auditing* is required study material for every local finance officer; it is well-suited for use in the classroom; and it should elicit wide-

spread professional acclaim just as prior publications of the National Committee have in the past.

The University of Texas

Lynn F. Anderson

WILBERT E. MOORE: *Industrialization and Labor*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, Pp., 410, \$5.00.)

Although industrialization is perhaps the most important characteristic of modern economic history, the process had not proceeded equally in all societies. But this form of economic development is rapidly spreading to the "backward" areas of the world. Too, industrialization is considered by many as the panacea for all the material woes of mankind. There is now a conscious effort by international planners to reduce the steep gradient separating the "leading" from the "undeveloped" nations. Thus, industrialization has become an important area of international social research. Studies and theories of economic development up to the present time have been largely limited to quantitative, demographic appraisals of the "labor force" neglecting the sociopsychological factors that induce or impede the transition toward industrial employment.

In his study Moore attempts to determine, "what kinds of circumstances will induce workers to leave traditional modes of production and enter modern economic activity, and what additional circumstances are necessary to secure the skills and services essential to the industrial mode of production with its attendant specialization."

The first portion of *Industrialization and Labor* provides a review of many studies bearing on the attitudes of native labor toward modern forms of economic activity. This section includes discussions of the factors restraining the native worker from embracing industrialism, circumstances "pushing" him into some form of modern enterprise, factors making the industrial system attractive to the native worker, evaluation of theories of economic motivation, and theoretical issues of the comparative survey of attitudes toward industrial labor.

The second section of the volume presents the results of intensive study made in Mexico. This study included a direct field study of two villages and two factories. Although the schedule used in the field investigation contained a wealth of information very little was used. The greatest contribution of Moore to social research in the present volume seems to be in theoretical formulation and cross-cultural comparisons. The bibliographical material which he presents will be especially useful. However, in the opinion of the reviewer, the analysis of the data obtained in the field survey is superficial. The study would have been strengthened greatly if more information from the field study had been utilized. Nevertheless, this volume will prove invaluable to social scientists, social

planners and policy makers who are concerned with the industrialization of the "backward" areas of the world.

Oklahoma A. & M. College

John C. Belcher

HARVEY J. LOCKE: *Predicting Adjustment in Marriage: A Comparison of a Divorced and a Happily Married Group.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951, Pp., 407, \$5.00.)

This is another attempt to find some suitable and reasonably dependable standard of testing through which success in marriage may be predicted. The study is patterned after *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* by Burgess and Cottrell, published in 1939. Similarity between the two is too great to be incidental.

The book is the result of a study of a "representative sample of the population", assuming, of course, that the county in which the study was made in Indiana is representative of the population of the United States. The author eventually corrects himself by stating on page 41 "The conclusions apply to a single county in the early years of the 1940 decade". More specifically, the conclusions are drawn from the data gathered from a sample of divorced and a sample of married people. "The divorce sample includes 201 persons with their respective mates, plus 123 persons where only one side of the case was secured", a total 324 cases, while "the married sample is composed of 200 persons with their respective mates, plus four cases where only one side was secured" or a total of 204 cases. The number of questions used, the relative values assigned to the answers and the final evaluation of the results is quite a comprehensive testing device, indicating the need for a complete understanding of many factors in a personality before prediction is made of the relative possibilities for success in marriage.

Probably the most useful part of the book is Chapter XV, "Conclusions and Problems for Research". It includes a comparison of the conclusions of several studies in marital adjustment. While nothing spectacular resulted from this study, there is further evidence accumulated here to indicate that personality traits of married people play a very important, if not the most important, part in making marriage successful. It is pointing the way toward the establishment of a workable testing program available for those who are interested enough before marriage to undergo a test indicating the possible degree of compatibility between two personalities.

Tulsa University

Sandor B. Kovacs

NORVAL MORRIS: *The Habitual Criminal.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, Pp., 395, \$5.00.)

The idea of "habitual criminals" has two connotations in American criminology: the first, perhaps the more general, pertains to the con-

firmed recidivists subject to statutory provisions for special, usually mandatory, sentences; the second, harking back at least to Lombroso, refers to a typological classification of criminal careers. In this study, a doctoral dissertation developed at London School by an Australian legal scholar, usage follows the former and focuses upon two problems; a comparative study of habitual offender legislation in Commonwealth and European nations and a review of British cases processed under such legislation or whose experience made them comparable.

The section devoted to legal review is particularly notable for information on the ways habitual offender acts have taken their place in given legal systems. This material should be invaluable for students of criminal law and for reference wherever institution or revision of habitual offender acts is considered. Written lucidly, it would offer American undergraduates in criminology courses broad perspective on such legislation.

The second section may be of more general interest to American criminologists. The research design could be adjusted to use in assessing the operation of habitual offender laws in this country or for examining the experience of repeated offenders. Morris' data are limited to case histories, used illustratively, and official records, subjected to census survey. His review does, however, contain leads which might be incorporated in an original schedule attempting to treat case history experience comparatively. Presumably an American study might supplement "legal" data extensively.

Morris hopes his data may have value for a Glueck-type follow-up study of British convicts. Perhaps they will. This would seem much more probable if the base group were taken not as what the law says habitual offenders are or cases conforming to these specifications though processed differently. Too many distinctive careers are lumped together by such means. A more essential prediction problem might evolve from examination of a series of cases quite rigidly selected in terms of type attributes. Riemer's study of embezzlers might provide a methodological model.

Oklahoma A. and M. College

Paul B. Foreman

HERTA LOEWY: *The Retarded Child*. (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1951, Pp., 160, \$3.75.)

The cover page says: "Herta Loewy has been occupied for many years with the education of the mentally retarded child and as a result of her research and experience wrote her introductory guide for the parents of such children. She has now written this handbook for the teacher and the social worker as well as for all those who care for the backward child. She shows how, by becoming part of the family pat-

tern, the child can be helped, if not completely to throw off his misfortune, at least to master it."

The sub-title of "The Retarded Child" is "A Guide For Parents, Teachers and Social Workers." And the book is just that. The one hundred sixty pages are divided into four parts, with a total of twenty-three chapters. From the first chapter, which is entitled "How to Begin," the author continues with careful and specific instructions of how to direct "The Retarded Child."

To indicate the nature of the content of the book, the titles of some of the very interesting chapters are. Care During Babyhood and Infancy, Fear, Mental Laziness, Applied Play Activities, Handwork in Infancy, Observation, General Training, Sense Training, Speech Training, Resistances and How to Overcome Them, Letters and Numbers, Drawing and Painting, Words and Sums, Reading, Writing, and Music and Rhythm. The additional chapters whose titles have not been given are equally important.

In a chapter called "The Grave and Recurrent Error," the author says: "I appeal, first and foremost for delayed classification. Because a child makes a poor showing either at an Intelligence Test or in a daily class, one must not mark him willy nilly as a mental defective." And again in the same chapter the author says: "It is not merely a matter of training and school learning, it is much, much more. It is a development of mind, character, personality, call it what you will, that little extra something that marks a child as normal instead of different from his brethren.

This book should have real and practical value for those who have direct responsibility for retarded children. There is today a greatly increased interest in and concern for "exceptional children." The author of "The Retarded Child" has made a real contribution to the knowledge of purpose and method in this area.

Trinity University

Charles N. Burrows

### Other Books Received

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Amato, Pedro Munoz: *La Educacion De Los Servidores Publicos: Experiencias En Puerto Rico Y Su Significacion Para La America Latina.* (Puerto Rico: Escuela de Administracion Publica, Colegio de Ciencias Sociales Universidad De Puerto Rico, 1952, Pp., 22. NP.)

Anderson, M. S.: *Geography of Living Things*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., 202, \$2.75.)

The Annals: *Murder and the Penalty of Death*. Thorsten Sellin, (Ed.) (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 1952, \$2.00.)

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Bauer, Elizabeth Kelly: *Commentaries On the Constitution*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, Pp., 400, \$4.75.)

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Bishop, Donald G. (Ed.) *Soviet Foreign Relations: Documents and Readings*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1952, Pp., viii, 223, \$3.75.)

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Freedman, Ronald, et al.: *Principles of Sociology.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952, Pp., 660, \$5.25.)

Gittler, Joseph B.: *Social Dynamics: Principles and Cases in Introductory Sociology.* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, Pp., 339, \$4.00.)

Goguel, Francois: *France Under the Fourth Republic.* (Cornell, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952, Pp., xiii, 198, \$3.00.)

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Heberly, Rudolph: *Social Movements.* (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951, Pp., 478, \$2.50.)

Holmes, Henry Alfred, and Holmes, Lula Thomas: *Mexico: Land of Great Experiments.* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1952, Pp., 62, \$0.35.)

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Key, V. O. Jr.: *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups.* (3rd ed.) (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952, Pp., xvi, 799, \$5.50.)

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Kornitzer, Margaret: *Child Adoption in the Modern World.* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., xiii, 403, \$4.50.)

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Levy, Marion J. Jr.: *The Structure of Society*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, Pp., viii, 584, \$5.00.)

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Redford, Emmette S.: *Administration of National Economic Control*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952, Pp., vii, 403, \$5.50.)

Runes, Dagobert D.: *Of God the Devil and the Jews*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., 181, \$3.00.)

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Swanson, Guy E. et al.: *Readings In Social Psychology*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952, Pp., xix, 680, \$5.00.)

Spiegel, Henry William, (Ed.): *The Development of Economic Thought*. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1952, Pp., xii, 811, \$6.00.)

Talbot, David A.: *Contemporary Ethiopia*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., vii, 267, \$4.50.)

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## News Notes

The Southwestern Social Science Association will hold its 1953 annual convention on Friday and Saturday, April 3 and 4, in the Hotel Adolphus, Dallas, Texas. Plans for the program are well advanced, under the direction of Professor Comer Clay, Texas Christian University, who is serving as General Program Chairman. Professor Clay has set up the following time schedule with respect to the development of the program, and participants and section chairmen are requested to cooperate in meeting the indicated deadlines: January 15—Each section chairman to mail to the General Program Chairman a tentative program for his section; also, each section chairman to inform the General Program Chairman of decisions regarding luncheons, joint meetings, and related matters; February 1—Tentative program mimeographed and mailed to membership by the General Program Chairman; February 15—Corrections and final program data mailed to General Program Chairman; immediate preparation of final program for printers; March 15—Summaries of prospective section programs and other suggested advance publicity data to be mailed to the General Program Chairman by the section chairmen.

We regret to report the resignation of Dr. W. M. Pritchett from the Board of Trustees of the Southwestern Social Science Foundation, which he has served as chairman. Dr. Rupert Richardson, Vice-Chairman of the Board, will assume responsibility for the Foundation. All correspondence should be addressed to him, at Hardin-Simmons University, or to Dr. Cortez A. M. Ewing, Secretary-Treasurer of the Board, at the University of Oklahoma.

During the past summer, the College-Business Exchange Program of the Foundation for Economic Education granted some 110 fellowships for placement of academic personnel with business concerns for six weeks study. Among fellowships granted in the southwestern region were the following: Raymond W. Ritland, Tulane, with American Steel & Wire, Cleveland; John D. Garwood, Fort Hays Kansas State College, with Santa Fe, Chicago; Ernest D. Hedgcock, Texas A. & M., with Bemis Bag Co., Boston; George T. Walker, Northwestern State College of Louisiana, with DuPont, Wilmington; Frank A. Young, Southern Methodist University, with Employers Casualty, Dallas; Joseph S. Begando, University of Kansas, with Goodrich, Akron; Herbert R. Mundhenke, Texas Christian University, with Motorola, Chicago; Harold A. Frey, University of Arkansas, and George E. Hartman, Texas A. & M., with Sears, Roebuck, Chicago; and Clement E. Trout, Oklahoma A. & M., with U. S. Steel, Pittsburgh.

A southwest regional conference on Universities and World Affairs, sponsored jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Southern Methodist University, the Southern Regional Education Board and the Committee on Education in International Relations of the Southern University Conference, met on the SMU campus at Dallas, December 12-14. Some 75 delegates of institutions in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma attended the sessions. Program participants included: President Umphrey Lee, Southern Methodist University; Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment; Howard E. Wilson, Executive Associate of the Carnegie Endowment; George F. Gant, Associate Director of the Southern Regional Education Board; E. E. Leisy, Lilly Professor of American History, Southern Methodist University; George E. Hunsberger, Professor of Economics, University of Arkansas; Roger P. McCutcheon, Dean of the Graduate School, Tulane; Peter J. Fliess, Professor of Government, Louisiana State University; Herbert Gambrell, Chairman, Department of History, Southern Methodist University; Lewis Hanke, Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas; Harvey Guice, Chairman, Department of Government, Southern Methodist University; Darrel K. Troxel, Assistant to the Dean of Students, Oklahoma A. & M. College; Oliver Benson, Professor of Government, University of Oklahoma; W. R. Woolrich, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Texas; Hemphill Hosford, Provost and Vice President, Southern Methodist University; Howard A. Cook, Chief, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State; John Claunch, Director of Dallas College, Southern Methodist University; Thomas S. Sutherland, Southwest Regional Director, Institute of International Education; and Cortell K. Holsapple, Dean of the Evening College, Texas Christian University.

Allan T. Steele, formerly at the University of Tulsa, has been appointed associate professor of accounting at Northwestern State College of Louisiana, Natchitoches.

Herbert R. Mundhenke, Texas Christian University, attended the Hazen Conference at Colorado Springs, August 11-16, 1952.

Dr. Homer L. Hitt, head of the Departments of Sociology and Rural Sociology, Louisiana State University, has been named acting dean of the Graduate School in the absence of Dean Richard J. Russell, who has been granted leave to accept the invitation of the French Morocco Geological Survey to study the coastline of that country.

The Department of Social Science at LSU has been merged with the Department of Sociology, which will henceforward have the responsibility of teaching the social science survey course. Dr. L. B. Lucky and Dr. Frank Girlinghouse are added to the Sociology staff, and a new

addition to the same department is Dr. Roland J. Pellegrin, who will work chiefly in industrial sociology.

The Departments of Sociology, Human Relations, and Psychology, University of Kansas, are engaged in a study of employment discrimination at Kansas City, Missouri, in collaboration with Community Studies, Inc., of that city. The Department of Sociology announces the promotion of Dr. Marston M. McCluggage to the rank of Professor of Sociology and Human Relations.

Dr. W. L. Roy Wellborne has been appointed Professor and Director of the Department of Economics and Business Administration, Texas State College for Women, Denton, replacing Dr. Rex F. Johnston, now President of San Angelo College, San Angelo, Texas. The department is launching for the spring semester a group of courses to prepare secretaries to take the CPS (Certified Professional Secretary) examinations. Next summer, June 11-12, the college will sponsor jointly with North Texas State College the sixth annual Business Education Conference, to be held on the TSCW campus.

Dr. Albert Parker, of the University of Oklahoma, has been appointed assistant professor of history at the Municipal University of Wichita.

Dr. Earl A. Saliers, Head of the Accounting Department, Louisiana State University, retired this past summer because of illness. Dr. Lloyd Morrison has been appointed Head of the Department in his place.

Texas A. & M. College is cooperating with the USDA, BAE in a social security project entitled Survey of Retirement Plans of Farm Families. Members of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology have completed the field study, and the first report concerning "life insurance" is to be released in January 1953. A committee in the department is planning a program for the 8th Annual Rural Church Conference to be held at College Station, Texas, next summer. Several members of the same department participated in the 2nd Annual Farm and Ranch Credit School for Commercial Bankers. Bankers attending the school were from Texas, Louisiana and New Mexico.

John H. Southern, Agricultural Economist, BAE, has returned from a 15-months assignment in Rome as the Technical Assistance Officer for the Land and Water Use Branch of F.A.O. While on this assignment, he served 3 months as F.A.O. Mission Chief in Pakistan. Mr. Southern is stationed at Texas A. & M. College with the Division of Land Economics, Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology.

Joe R. Motheral, Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, Texas A. & M. College, has been granted a year's

leave of absence to work in the Division of Farm Population and Rural Life, BAE, as acting chief, Farm Labor Section.

Dr. John Paul Duncan, Associate Professor of Government, University of Oklahoma, is on leave of absence this academic year as a teaching fellow in Cairo, Egypt, under a Fulbright grant.

George M. Beckman, Department of History, University of Kansas, has received both Fulbright and Ford Foundation awards for a year of study in Japan.

Professor George L. Anderson, Chairman, Department of History, University of Kansas, and Nyle H. Miller, Secretary of the State Historical Society, participated on the program of a conference on the writing of local history held in cooperation with the Medicine Lodge Indian Peace Treaty Association, October 10-11, 1952.

The Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma A. & M. College, announces the return of Assistant Professor Leo V. Blakley from a year's study at the University of Chicago. Howard S. Whitney, Assistant Professor in Marketing, has been granted a leave of absence and is spending the year at the University of Chicago. Assistant Professor Loris A. Parcher, who is editor of *Current Farm Economics*, has been granted a leave for study at Texas A. & M.

John W. White, Head of the Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas, and W. R. Morrison, instructor in the department, returned this fall from Panama, where they studied problems of the marketing of agricultural products. The study was undertaken for the University's Agricultural Mission to that country. John D. Campbell, assistant professor in the department, formerly of Oklahoma A. & M., has started research on farm management of cotton farms. James H. White has been appointed graduate assistant in farm management. William S. Folkman, who studied at Utah State, University of Utah, Copenhagen and Cornell, assumed his duties in August as assistant professor for research and teaching in rural sociology. R. L. Underwood, of Oklahoma A. & M., and R. C. Ross, of the University of Illinois, were visiting professors during the summer in the department.